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During World War I, a group of Belgian women famously helped the Allied forces
defeat Germany in the first battle of Marne. With the German army marching
aggressively towards the Western Front, the French and British forces required an
estimate of the pace at which Germany was concentrating its troops and resources
near the French border. Since every soldier, every can of food, and every piece of
ammunition were transported by trains into Belgium, the Belgian resistance recruited
women to knit this information onto sweaters. The women knitted, sitting at their
windows, looking outside at the trains – a bumpy stitch for every wagon that car-
ried troops and a dropped stitch for every wagon that carried resources. The sweaters
were then handed over to a soldier from the resistance through merchants who carried
these information-embedded sweaters among other regular sweaters to the market in
full view of vigilant German soldiers. Thus, crucial information about the German
arsenal was transmitted to France in plain sight using an unsuspected medium.
A few years later, during the height of the Cold War, CIA agents resorted to
creative ways to transmit messages without attracting any attention since they were
unaware if they were being watched. According to the recently declassified Cold War-
era training manual for CIA field agents [1], the agents were trained to hide messages
in shoelace patterns by modifying the way shoelaces were fed through the shoes’
eyelets. Although alternate ways of tying shoelaces rarely attracted any unwanted
attention, the patterns were easily perceived by other agents who were actively looking
for such a signal. This way, the agents converted an often overlooked piece of apparel
into a medium for signaling messages such as I have information for you, I have
brought another person with me, and Follow me. Moreover, CIA agents were also
1
trained [1] to use the color of shirt buttons and placement of pen in shirt pockets to
communicate without being detected.
Later, in 1966, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence confirmed for the first time
that American prisoners of war were being mistreated in northern Vietnam after the
broadcast of Admiral Jeremiah Denton’s interview shot for propaganda purposes.
The Northern Vietnamese Army had forbidden Denton from revealing the true con-
ditions of the prison camp and had given him scripted answers about the treatment
of prisoners in the camp. Although Denton stuck to the script for his answers in the
video, he could be seen blinking uncomfortably every once in a while. When inquired
about his strange actions, Denton feigned by citing trouble with the blinding spot-
light. In fact, as the U.S. intelligence would later reveal, Admiral Jeremiah Denton
had spelled out T-O-R-T-U-R-E by blinking his eyes in a Morse code pattern. Denton
had used his television appearance and innocuous verbal answers as the medium to
hide his one-word message to the world. Numerous other incidents in history [2] have
called for a means to communicate without being detected.
In all the above cases, the adversary failed to identify the presence of a hidden
message because he was not actively looking for it. To put it in simple words, the
message remained hidden only because the adversary was not aware of the medium
in which the message was embedded. However, according to Kerchkoff’s principle
or Shannon’s maxim [3], the adversary should possess the same knowledge of the
information-hiding scheme as the parties involved in the communication with the
exception of a secret key, if any. In many scenarios, the very intention to transmit
information is considered an act of breach and could result in the adversary shutting
down the channel and punishing the users. Simmons introduced one such scenario
as the prisoners’ problem [4], in which two prisoners exchange messages in the hope
that they can coordinate to devise an escape plan while a warden monitors the com-
munication and only allows the transmission of innocuous messages. On detection of
2
the presence of any non-innocuous message, the warden will punish both prisoners
and send them to separate high-security prisons for the rest of their lives irrespective
of the content of their messages.
In this work, we address the general problem of computing the maximum rate at
which information can be transmitted over certain multi-user channels while simulta-
neously escaping detection from an adversary. We also address the advantage gained
by ensuring that the adversary is not synchronized with the covert transmitter. This
work is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss previous works related to
various information-hiding schemes and Low Probability of Detection (LPD) commu-
nication, and also review a mathematical framework to analyze LPD communication.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5, detail our results on covert communication over multiple-access,






As mentioned in the previous chapter, in certain scenarios, users are required to
keep their transmission status a secret. In such situations, obscuring a message by
encryption does not suffice since the very presence of an encrypted message gives away
the presence of a message. For instance, the existence of encrypted communication
between an individual and an adversarial foreign government reveals the possibility of
espionage. Consequently, a necessity to use techniques other than encryption arises to
hide the status of transmission. Techniques commonly associated with undetectable
communication include steganography and spread spectrum communication.
2.1.1 Steganography
Steganography, derived from the Greek word στϵγανω meaning concealed writing, is
an information-hiding scheme that conceals a message in an innocent-looking cover-
text. The transmitter embeds the message1 in the covertext to produce a stegotext.
The adversary2 with the knowledge of the properties of the covertext attempts to
detect the presence of a message. A stegotext that closely resembles the covertext
hinders the adversary from detecting the presence of the message. As an example,
Figure 2.1(a) illustrates an image of Claude Shannon and serves as our cover image.
Figure 2.1(b) illustrates3 the cover image embedded with a payload of 1093 words.
Although the two images look identical on visual inspection, we illustrate the en-
1plaintext or an encrypted plaintext (ciphertext)
2An adversary may either be active or passive. While both attempt to detect the presence of a
message, the former also attempts to remove or modify the embedded message. Henceforth, we only
discuss passive adversaries throughout this document.
3Message embedded using steghide 0.5.1.
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(a) Cover image (b) Message-embedded image (c) Enhanced difference
Figure 2.1: Image steganography
hanced difference between the two images in Figure 2.1(c). This particular image
steganographic technique works by identifying pairs of pixels whose exchange would
embed the message while remaining undetectable to basic statistical tests. However,
several other simple embedding schemes are dreadful in hiding messages even from
adversaries using basic statistical tests. For instance, sequential steganography [5],
which involves embedding the message in consecutive samples, can be detected by a
simple cumulative-sum test [6] because of the abrupt change in local statistics.
To design well-performing steganographic techniques, it is necessary to compute
the maximum amount of information that can be hidden in a given covertext. While
Maurer [7] first drew the connection between steganography and hypothesis testing,
Cachin introduced an information-theoretic model for steganography [8] by proposing
an adversary who estimates the presence of an embedded message using a metric that
only depends on the statistics of the stegotext and the covertext. Subsequently, Ker
studied batch steganography [9], in which the payload is spread across n different cover
objects each with the same capacity, and he observed that the throughput scales on
the order of
√
n. He also showed [10] that a linear increase in the message length
with the number of cover objects leads to detection at the adversary. Specifically,
the square-root low of steganography [11] states that at most O (
√
n) bits can be
hidden in a covertext of size n. While Ker [12] showed that steganography can be
5
achieved using a secret key on the order of the size of the payload, he also rendered
the secret key unnecessary in certain cases by widely spreading the possible payload
locations in a large cover [13]. Unlike previous works [9, 10] that used independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) cover objects to embed information, Filler et al. [14]
analyzed steganography using Markovian covers since i.i.d. covers do not capture the
inter-dependence that is a characteristic of commonly-used covers such as images and
video frames. A few other works [15, 16] have showed that embedding messages in a
transform space rather than in the actual covertext is also subject to the square-root
law.
2.1.2 Spread spectrum techniques
To avoid detection, defense systems around the world use spread spectrum tech-
niques [17]. Specifically, Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) communication
techniques spread a signal of bandwidth WM over a much wider bandwidth WS ≫ WM
using a high frequency pseudo-random chip sequence, thus ultimately reducing the
Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the signal to be close to the PSD of the noise [18].
Consequently, DSSS signals are immune from adversaries employing energy detec-
tion [19] or narrowband signal detection [20]. However, contrary to popular belief,
DSSS signals can be detected by adversaries using autocorrelation- and cyclic feature-
based detectors [21, 22, 23]. Although Chuang et al. [24] improved upon conven-
tional spread spectrum techniques by using noise-modulation techniques to prevent
detection by conventional receivers, Bash et al. [25] showed that spread spectrum
communication is also subject to the square-root law if the communication is to be
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Figure 2.2: Communication in the presence of a warden
2.2 Covert communication
The problem of covert communication can be formalized using the communication
model illustrated in Figure 2.2, in which the transmitter communicates a message
to the legitimate receiver with the help of a secret key4 while preventing the warden
from correctly estimating the status of transmission. Prior to discussing the model
mathematically in Section 2.2.2, we first introduce the notation used throughout the
document.
2.2.1 Notation
We denote random variables and their realizations in upper and lower case, respec-
tively. All sequences in boldface are n-length sequences, where n ∈ N∗, unless spec-
ified otherwise. A sequence of random variables (Yj, Yj+1, . . . , Yk) is denoted by Ykj .
We drop the subscript and superscript when the context is clear. The element at
position ℓ ∈ J1, nK of a sequence xj is denoted by xj,ℓ. Throughout this document,
we interpret log and exp to the base 2. Adhering to standard information-theoretic
notation, H(X) represents the average entropy of X. For p ∈ [0, 1], let Hb (p) repre-
sent the binary entropy: Hb (p) ≜ −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). If the distribution of
X and the channel between X and Y are represented by P and WY |X , respectively,




represent the average mutual information between X

















Figure 2.3: Covert communication over a point-to-point channel.
and Y . For two distributions, P and Q, defined on the same finite alphabet X , the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is D(P∥Q) ≜
∑




distance is V(P,Q) ≜ 1
2
∑
x |P (x)−Q(x)|. KL divergence and variational distance
are related by Pinsker’s inequality [26] as V(P,Q)2 ⩽ 1
2
D(P∥Q). We denote the chi-






If P is absolutely continuous with respect to (w.r.t.) Q, we write P ≪ Q. For x ∈ R,
we define [x]+ ≜ max(x, 0). For a set T , we represent the vector {Xk : k ∈ T } by
X [T ]. We denote the cartesian product ×k∈T Xk by X [T ] and an empty set by ∅, the
cardinality of a set T by |T |, and the set difference of two sets S and T by S \ T .
2.2.2 Information-theoretic framework for LPD communication
To set up a mathematical framework for LPD communication, we use the point-
to-point channel model [27] illustrated in Figure 2.3, in which Alice, the legitimate
transmitter, transmits a covert message W to Bob, the legitimate receiver, using a
secret key S while simultaneously escaping detection from Willie, the warden. Alice
encodes a uniformly distributed message W ∈ J1,MK and a uniformly distributed
secret key S ∈ J1, KK into an n-length codeword X(W,S) ∈ X n and transmits over
the Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC)
(
X ,WY |X ,Y
)
in the presence of Willie
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Figure 2.4: ROC curve of Willie’s detector
Y ∈ Yn and forms an estimate Ŵ of W with knowledge of the key S, whereas Willie
observes Z ∈ Zn and performs a hypothesis test that we explain later. Since the
channel to Willie is memoryless, we define the transition probability corresponding
to n uses of the channel by W ⊗nZ|X ≜
∏n
i=1 WZ|X . We assume a binary-input alphabet
X ≜ {0, 1} and finite output alphabets Y and Z. We let 0 ∈ X be the innocent
symbol corresponding to the channel input when no communication takes place.
2.2.3 Hypothesis testing
In the channel model detailed above, the primary objective of Willie is to detect
whether Alice transmits a covert message or not based on his observation Z. Towards
that end, Willie performs a statistical hypothesis test on his observation Z, with
the null hypothesis H0 corresponding to the absence of any covert transmission and
the alternate hypothesis H1 corresponding to the presence of a covert transmission.
During this process, Willie might make two types of errors, namely, the probability of
false alarm defined by α ≜ P(H1 is accepted|H0 is true) and the probability of missed
detection defined by β ≜ P(H0 is accepted|H1 is true). While β is a measure of Alice’s
ability to evade detection, α is a measure of how certain Willie is that he has detected
9
a covert transmission. To illustrate the performance of Willie’s detector, we plot its
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which is a plot of the probability
of detection (1− β) against the probability of false alarm α, in Figure 2.4. Ideally,
Willie would want to operate at the point (0, 1), where he can detect any transmission
without any error making transmission of covert messages impossible. On the other
hand, if Willie ignores his observation and bases his decision on the result of a random
coin-toss, he can operate at any point on the diagonal on which α + β = 1, and it
corresponds to his worst performance in detecting the covert transmission.
Defining Q⊗n0 (z) ≜
∏n
i=1Q0(zi), where Q0(z) ≜ WZ|X(z|0), we let Q⊗n0 be the
innocent distribution expected at Willie when no covert communication takes place.
We also define Q̂n as the distribution induced at Willie by covert transmission. Willie
then constructs an optimal hypothesis test that minimizes α + β to attribute his












our objective is to escape detection from Willie, we want the decision of the statistical
test used by Willie to be no better than a random guess, i.e., we want to restrict





using the Jensen-Shannon divergence and showed that a





which in turn guarantees that Willie’s detector operates close to the diagonal. Note
that we only constrain Willie to operate close to the diagonal; the exact point of
operation of the detector is determined by Willie. In [29], Tahmasbi and Bloch used
each of the following metrics to measure covertness — KL divergence, variational
distance, and the optimal probability of missed detection for a fixed α — and showed
that measuring covertness in terms of the variational distance captures the operational
performance of Willie better than using KL divergence or the optimal β for a fixed
α. However, throughout this document, we use the KL divergence as our covertness
10
metric for reasons that we discuss in Section 2.3.1.
2.2.4 Previous works on LPD communication
In this subsection, we summarize previous works related to LPD communication. In-
spired by steganographic techniques and Hero’s secure space-time codes [30], Bash et
al. [25] analyzed covert communication5, over a point-to-point channel model obtained
by replacing the DMCs in Figure 2.3 with Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
channels. They showed that covert communication is subject to the square-root law,
which states that Alice can only send O (
√
n) bits to Bob in n channel uses while en-
suring that α+β ⩾ 1− ϵ for an arbitrary ϵ > 0 at Willie. Alternatively, transmitting
ω (
√
n) bits in n channel uses either results in detection by Willie with probability one
or a non-zero decoding error probability at Bob as n → ∞ [25]. The square-root law
for LPD communication schemes [31] stems from the observation that the standard
deviation of the noise distribution over n channel uses is on the order of O (
√
n),





to induce a distribution
that is indistinguishable from the one induced by just noise from the perspective of






i.e., the ratio of the number of bits transmitted to the number of channel uses van-
ishes asymptotically. Although Hero [30] first identified that an LPD communication
scheme is subject to an average power constraint, he did not analyze the constraint
asymptotically. As a result, he did not observe the square-root law first identified in
steganography.
In the scheme analyzed by Bash et al. [25], Alice randomly chooses O (
√
n) em-
bedding locations out of n symbols and shares this set of locations with Bob. Each
symbol location is represented by logn bits and there are O (
√
n) such symbol loca-
tions. Hence, a secret key of size O (
√
n logn) has to be shared between Alice and Bob
5Henceforth, we use covert communication as an alias for LPD communication.
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prior transmission. This scheme is rather inefficient since the key is longer than the
actual message to be hidden. Surprisingly, Che et al. [32] showed that a secret key
is unnecessary for covert communication over a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC)
provided the channel to the warden is noisier than the channel to the legitimate re-
ceiver. Later, Bloch [27] generalized the results to DMCs and showed that the size
of the shared key can be reduced from O (
√
n logn) to O (
√
n) bits using channel
resolvability techniques, which we discuss later in this section. Following the idea
that the use of a secret key can be avoided if Bob can exploit a channel asymmetry
to his advantage, Bloch also formulated the channel condition required for keyless
covert communication [27]. Wang [33] developed a converse for the square-root law,
which when combined with the achievable scheme outlined in [27], established a tight
first-order asymptotic characterization of the covert throughput over point-to-point
channels. Subsequently, Tahmasbi and Bloch [29] analyzed the second-order asymp-
totic characterization of the covert throughput. Tahmasbi et al. [34] also developed
upper and lower bounds for the error exponent of covert communication over binary-
input DMCs.
It is important to note that while covertness ensures that the presence of a covert
message is hidden from the warden, he is not forbidden from trying to decode his
observation. However, in certain scenarios, legitimate users might want to keep the
transmission secret in addition to hiding it. Towards that end, Bloch [27] showed
that under certain channel conditions, a portion of the covert message is inherently
secret from the warden and that the transmitter can secure the remaining portion
of the message by using a secret key. In [35, 36], the authors require their covert
communication schemes to be hidable in addition to being covert, i.e., the warden
should not be able to estimate what the potential message is, even if he assumes the
presence of a covert message. They showed that the transmitter can still send O (
√
n)
covert bits despite the additional hidability requirement.
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While instituting a channel asymmetry in favor of the receiver can help transmit
O (
√
n) covert bits without the need for a secret key, the uncertainty of the warden
about channel noise parameters helps the users transmit a linear number of covert bits
in some cases. In case the warden is uncertain about the BSC noise parameter, Che
et al. [37] showed that the square-root law can be circumvented even if an impairing
assumption that the receiver is also uncertain about his channel noise parameter
is made. Lee et al. [38, 39] investigated LPD communication in AWGN Rayleigh
channels with noise uncertainty at the warden and a sub-optimal radiometer at his
disposal, and affirmed that if Alice transmits below the SNR wall [40], which is the
threshold below which the detector is non-robust, it is impossible for the warden to
detect covert transmission even if the rate is linear. Moreover, Lee et al. [41] extended
their techniques over Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) Rayleigh channels and
quantified the improvement in covert throughput as a result of increasing the number
of antennas at the legitimate users. Alternatively, Lee et al. [42] established channel
asymmetry in a state-dependent AWGN channel by letting the transmitter possess
non-causal channel state information and showed that covert bits can be transmitted
with a linear rate.
It is common practice in information-theoretic works to assume that all users
involved are synchronized, i.e., all users are aware of the start and end times of the
transmission. However, in covert communication scenarios, in which the transmitter
tries to hide his presence in the network, it is justified to assume that warden is not
synchronized with the transmitter. It is also fair to assume that the legitimate users
are still synchronized since they can use a part of their secret key to synchronize before
transmission. Since the warden is unaware of the start time of the transmission, he
has to monitor the channel for a much longer duration than the actual transmission
window. Bash et al. [43] showed that the transmitter can take advantage of this




n logT (n), n
})
bits to the receiver by choosing
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a single slot of n symbols from T (n) such slots. Although [43] requires a secret
key denoting the index of the chosen time slot to be shared with the receiver, an
additional key of size logT (n) results in a multiplicative gain of
√
logT (n) in the
covert throughput. Subsequently, Goeckel et al. [44] proved an alternative result that




n logT (n), n
})
covert bits in a
similar channel setting even if he is uncertain about the background noise power. The
result is attributed to the fact that the warden can learn the channel noise statistics
from his observations since most of the time slots are unoccupied by the transmitter.
A few works have also attempted to transmit covert information in queues [45] by
manipulating the timing between packets. Soltani et al. [46] analyzed a scheme that
embeds covert information in the arrival times of packets in a Poisson packet channel.




bits in time period T over an
M/M/1 queue with arrival rate λ by inserting new packets into the channel and
O (λT ) bits by altering the timing of incoming packets. Mukherjee and Ulukus [47]
showed that one can achieve a positive rate by embedding covert information in the
packet timings in exponential and general queues provided a high-rate secret key is
available. Soltani et al. [48] also showed that covert bit insertion in packets whose
sizes satisfy certain requirements are subject to the square-root law as well.
Since covert messages are hidden in noise, cooperative jammers can help the trans-
mitter improve the covert rate via two methods. First, by generating background
chatter, the jammers increase background noise and inhibit the warden’s ability to
detect covert transmission. Soltani et al. [49] quantified the improvement in covert
throughput when a friendly jammer, who is proximally located to the warden, gen-
erates artificial noise. Second, by varying their transmit powers sufficiently, the
jammers render the warden’s observations outside the sender’s transmission window
futile in learning the statistics of the channel. However, these cooperative jammers
should not be concerned to transmit non-covertly in the presence of the warden. In
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the presence of non-covert cooperative nodes, the transmitter can route [50] covert
information through them while ensuring that no communication between any two
nodes in the multi-hop path is detected by the warden or multiple collaborating war-
dens.
Some works have also investigated explicit code constructions for covert commu-
nication. While low-complexity encoding and decoding is a crucial requirement for
codes in general, codes for covert communication also need to be of low-weight and
the information bits have to be spread out in the codeword to escape detection at the
warden. Zhang et al. [51] constructed a computationally efficient coding scheme for
BSC with an inner random code and an outer Reed-Solomon code. Addressing the
sparsity requirement of covert codewords using Pulse Position Modulation (PPM)-
based codes, Bloch and Guha [52] showed their optimality for covert communication
over DMCs. Meanwhile, Frèche et al. [53] introduced a polarization-based code con-
struction for asynchronous covert communication. Although polarization ensures low
complexity, this particular coding scheme does not achieve covert capacity. Subse-
quently, Kadampot et al. [54] proved that linear codes cannot achieve covert capacity
and devised a low complexity multi-level PPM-based coding scheme for binary-input
DMCs that achieves covert capacity.
As discussed earlier, in certain scenarios, the users need access to a secret key to
communicate covertly. However, it is possible that the users had not agreed upon a
secret key earlier. In such scenarios, it is essential that the users synthesize a secret
key covertly since a public attempt at key generation would result in the warden
speculating a potential covert transmission. To this end, Tahmasbi and Bloch [55,
56] proposed a key distribution scheme in which the process itself is covert from the
adversary.
Besides classical communication channels, an extensive body of literature also
exists for covert communication over quantum channels. Bash et al. [57, 58] showed
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that covert communication over a lossy thermal-noise bosonic channel is also subject
to the square-root law. Sheikholeslami et al. [59] showed that classical-quantum
channels are subject to the square-root law, while Wang [60] computed the exact
optimal constant of the scaling.
2.2.5 Distinction from steganography
Unlike LPD communication schemes in which the transmitter only possesses knowl-
edge of the statistical properties of the noise in which he attempts to hide his message,
the steganographic transmitter possesses complete knowledge of the exact covertext
before he embeds his message. Consequently, steganographic techniques are not
necessarily robust against addition of noise from external sources. Since in LPD
communication, the noise added by the channel serves as the cover in which the mes-
sage is hidden, steganographic methods cannot be directly applied to communicate
information across a noisy channel with LPD.
2.2.6 Distinction from stealth
Borrowing terminology from [61], we define communication schemes that shape message-
carrying signals to resemble an innocent signal (as opposed to noise) as stealth or Low
Probability of Interception (LPI) communication techniques. Essentially, LPI com-
munication schemes attempt to prevent the adversary from analyzing the transmission
to determine if it contains meaningful information or not. Although the definitions
of LPD and LPI are deceptively similar, it is important to highlight the differences
between them. First, LPD communication is an extreme version of LPI since the
signals are shaped to hide in noise. Second, while the throughput in LPD commu-
nication is subject to the square-root law, LPI communication techniques achieve
a positive rate by transmitting random codewords that approximate the target dis-
tribution at the receiver even if there is no transmission of information. In short,
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LPD communication schemes attempt to approximate the innocent distribution Q⊗n0 ,
where Q0 = WZ|X(z|0), whereas LPI communication schemes, for instance, attempt
to approximate a target i.i.d. distribution Q⊗nZ where QZ(z) ≜
∑
x PX(x)WZ|X(z|x)
at the warden for some input distribution PX [62].
2.3 Covert capacity
In this section, we introduce two concepts, namely, covert process and channel re-
solvability, that are essential to define and understand covert capacity. Then, we
recall the characterization of the covert capacity [27] for the point-to-point channel
illustrated in Figure 2.3.
2.3.1 Covert process
We introduce the notion of covert process, which is an i.i.d. process indistinguishable
from the innocent distribution Q⊗n0 in the limit. The rationale behind introducing the
covert process is to precisely quantify the fraction of channel uses Alice can transmit
symbol 1 while simultaneously avoiding detection from Willie. For n ∈ N∗, we let
αn ∈ (0, 1). Let us define the input distribution Παn on X by
Παn(1) = 1− Παn(0) = αn. (2.1)















Lemma 1. [27, Lemma 1] Let {αn}n⩾1 be such that αn ∈ (0, 1) and limn→∞ αn = 0.
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αn)χ (Q1∥Q0) . (2.4)
If Alice generates an n-length sequence x using the product distribution Π⊗nαn , the
weight of x is nαn on average. Moreover, for the covert process to be indistinguishable











nD(Qαn∥Q0) = 0. (2.5)
Using KL divergence instead of variational distance as our covertness metric allows us
to write (2.5) by taking advantage of the i.i.d. property of Q⊗nαn and Q
⊗n
0 , and enables
us to use the results of Lemma 1 to conclude that if we choose the sequence {αn}n∈N∗
such that limn→∞ nα2n = 0, then Willie cannot distinguish between Q⊗nαn and Q
⊗n
0 in
the limit. Hence, the process Q⊗nαn is covert if the input parameter αn is on the order
of 1√
n
. As a consequence, the input sequence generated by Π⊗nαn has
√
n information
symbols on average confirming that the rate of covert transmission is subject to the
square-root law.
By definition, for LPD communication, we wish to design a scheme that induces
a distribution close to Q⊗n0 . We have already proved that the process Q⊗nαn and Q
⊗n
0
are indistinguishable in the limit. Alternatively, designing a scheme that approxi-
mates Q⊗nαn instead of Q
⊗n
0 allows us to convey covert information by using symbol
1. Specifically, we can choose the sequence {αn}n∈N∗ such that limn→∞ nαn = ∞
so that the number of information bits grows as n grows to infinity, thus conveying
covert information. To design a communication scheme that induces a distribution
close to the covert process Q⊗nαn , we use channel resolvability techniques, which we
discuss next.
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Figure 2.5: Approximation of output statistics
2.3.2 Channel resolvability
To explain the notion of channel resolvability first introduced by Han and Verdú [63],
we consider the channel model illustrated in Figure 2.5. In the first instance shown
at the top part of the figure, transmitting an n-length i.i.d. input sequence X ≜
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) distributed according to P ⊗nX through the DMC
(
X ,WY |X ,Y
)
in-




W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)P ⊗nX (x). (2.6)
As shown in the second instance at the bottom part of Figure 2.5, we wish to approx-
imate the output distribution Q⊗nZ using a set of M codewords {xw}
M
w=1 generated
according to the distribution P ⊗nX . Let us denote the distribution induced by the







Then, we can guarantee [63] that there exist codebooks with lim
n→∞
D(P nZ∥Q⊗nZ ) = 0
if logM > I(X;Y ). Intuitively, transmitting at a rate above the capacity of the
channel WZ|X causes the transmission to lose all of its structure at the output and
results in an output distribution that closely approximates the reference distribution.
The minimum of all achievable resolvability rates over the channel WZ|X w.r.t. the
reference distribution QZ is called the resolvability of the channel WZ|X . This set of
19
codewords {xw}Mm=1 forms a channel resolvability code for the channel WZ|X w.r.t.
the distribution Q⊗nZ .
For LPD communication, channel resolvability codes are especially useful to ap-
proximate the covert process Q⊗nαn at Willie. If our codebook C induces an output
distribution Q̂n, the codebook C is a channel resolvability code that approximates




= 0. Bloch [27] first
used channel resolvability-based codes for LPD and showed that they can achieve
covert capacity over a point-to-point channel. In all subsequent chapters, we use
channel resolvability-based codes in our covert communication schemes.
2.3.3 Covert capacity of a point-to-point channel
For the channel model illustrated in Figure 2.3, Alice needs to ensure that her commu-









= 0. Consequently, covert communication falls in the zero-
rate regime in which the number of covert bits scales sub-linearly with the number of
channel uses. Hence, it is necessary to normalize logM differently to characterize the
number of covert bits that can be transmitted in n channel uses. Combining the fact











to get meaningful constants as shown in
the following theorem. Note that we refer to logM∗√
nD(Q̂n∥Q⊗n0 )
as throughput rather than
rate to emphasize the different normalization.
Theorem 1. [27] For the point-to-point channel model illustrated in Figure 2.3 with







Let M∗ be the largest possible value of M such that a code with increasing block length
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In addition, to achieve a covert throughput that matches the covert capacity, the











[D(Q1∥Q0)− D(P1∥P0)]+ . (2.10)
In the achievability proof, Bloch [27] used channel resolvability-based codes to
first approximate the covert process Q⊗nαn defined in (2.3). Then, using the result of
Lemma 1, he proves that the proposed communication scheme is indeed covert. From
Theorem 1, we conclude that Alice can achieve her maximum covert throughput
without a secret key only if D(P1∥P0) ⩾ D(Q1∥Q0), i.e., if the channel from Alice to
Bob is better than the channel from Alice to Willie.
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CHAPTER 3
COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER A K-USER MULTIPLE-ACCESS
CHANNEL
3.1 Summary
In this chapter, we consider a scenario in which K transmitters attempt to commu-
nicate covert messages reliably to a legitimate receiver over a discrete memoryless
MAC while simultaneously escaping detection from an adversary who observes their
communication through another discrete memoryless MAC. We assume that each
transmitter may use a secret key that is shared only between itself and the legitimate
receiver. We show that each of the K transmitters can transmit on the order of
√
n
reliable and covert bits per n channel uses, exceeding which, the warden will be able
to detect the communication. We identify the optimal pre-constants of the scaling,
which leads to a complete characterization of the covert capacity region of the K-user
binary-input MAC. We show that, asymptotically, all sum-rate constraints are in-
active unlike the traditional MAC capacity region. We also characterize the channel
conditions that have to be satisfied for the transmitters to operate without a secret
key.
3.2 Introduction
The main result developed in this paper is the characterization of the covert capacity
region of the K-user binary-input MAC. The tools used are natural extensions of
the techniques developed for point-to-point covert and stealth channels in [27, 33,
62] and for MAC resolvability [64, 65, 66], but the converse proof requires special
care beyond the approach used in [27]. We show that, asymptotically, there exist no
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sum-rate constraints unlike the traditional MAC rate region; intuitively, this happens
because covertness is such a stringent constraint that the covert users never transmit
enough bits to saturate the capacity of the channel. The system behaves as if a
covert communication budget were merely allocated to the different users.1 A similar
behavior was observed [67, Theorem 6] in the calculation of the channel capacity per
unit cost of a two-user MAC when both users consist of a free input symbol; however,
note that the covert constraint is more stringent than an average per symbol cost
constraint.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we formally
introduce our channel model and define the covert capacity region. In Section 3.4, we
develop a preliminary result that captures the essence of our approach to covertness
and extends [27, Lemma 1]. We establish the covert capacity region of the K-user
binary-input MAC in Section 3.5 and conclude our work with a brief discussion of
extensions and open problems in Section 3.6. The proofs of all lemmas are relegated
to the appendix at the end of this chapter. This chapter is based on the results
obtained in [68, 69].
3.3 Channel model
We define the set K ≜ J1, KK, where K ∈ N∗ and K ⩾ 2. We analyze the channel
model illustrated in Figure 3.1, in which K transmitters simultaneously communicate










. As both channels are memoryless, we denote the transition





i=1WZ|X[K]. In addition, we assume for simplicity of exposition that each
user k ∈ K uses the same binary input alphabet Xk ≜ X ≜ {0, 1} and that the output



























H0 : Q  n 
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 W[K]
Figure 3.1: Model of covert communication over a MAC with K transmitters.
alphabets Y and Z are finite. We let 0 ∈ X be the innocent symbol corresponding to
the channel input when no communication takes place. We assume that all terminals
are synchronized and possess complete knowledge of the coding scheme used.
The user indexed by k ∈ K, encodes a uniformly-distributed message Wk ∈ J1,MkK
and a uniformly-distributed secret key Sk ∈ J1, LkK, which is shared only with the
receiver, into a codeword Xk(Wk, Sk) ∈ X n of length n. We denote the collection of
the K codewords {Xk (Wk, Sk)}k∈K by XK (W [K], S[K]). When the context is clear,
we drop the message and key indices, Wk and Sk, and denote Xk(Wk, Sk) by Xk
instead for conciseness. It is convenient to think about the K inputs to the channel
over n uses as a matrix X [K] of size K × n obtained by vertically stacking the K
codewords, each of which is a row vector. The inputs corresponding to all users
indexed by the elements of a non-empty set U ⊂ K is a sub-matrix of X [K] obtained
by selecting the rows whose indices belong to U and is denoted by X [U ]. The K
users then transmit codewords X [K] over the channel in n channel uses. At the end
of transmission, the receiver observes Y while the warden observes Z, both of which
are of length n.
We introduce a K-length row vector XU = (X1, X2, . . . , XK), U ⊆ K, with entry
Xk = 1 if k ∈ U and Xk = 0 otherwise. With our assumption that all channel inputs
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are binary, we represent every column of the matrix X [K] by a vector (XU)T , where
the set U consists of the indices of all users transmitting symbol 1 in this column. We
denote the kth component of XU by XU ,k. In accordance with the notation introduced
in the previous paragraph, XU [T ] represents a row vector of length |T | that contains
the entries {XU ,k}k∈T . Note the difference between X [U ] and XU ; the former is a
|U|-length vector {Xk}k∈U whereas the latter is a K-length vector with 1’s in indices
that belong to the set U . For conciseness, we define
PU(y) ≜ WY |X[K](y|xU), QU(z) ≜ WZ|X[K](z|xU), (3.1)
which represent the one-shot output distributions at the legitimate receiver and the
warden, respectively, when only the transmitters in U ⊆ K transmit symbol 1, while
the transmitters in U c transmit a 0. When U is a singleton set {k}, which corresponds
to user k transmitting 1 and all other users transmitting 0, we write Pk and Qk
instead of P{k} and Q{k}, respectively. If U = ∅, which occurs when all users transmit
the innocent symbol 0, we write P∅ and Q∅. We assume that QU ≪ Q∅ for all
non-empty sets U ⊆ K and that Q∅ cannot be written as a convex combination








QT (z) for some {µk}k∈K ∈
[0, 1]K \ {0}k∈K. In the former case, covert communication involving all K users is
impossible; in the latter case, covert communication would directly follow from known
channel resolvability results [64, 65, 66] and would be possible at a non zero-rate. We
also assume that there does not exist {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K with
∑
k∈K ρk = 1 such that∑
k∈K ρkQk(z) = Q∅(z) for all z ∈ Z. As we shall see later in Section 3.4, the square
root law of covert communication can be circumvented if such a {ρk}k∈K exists.
Upon observing Y, the legitimate receiver estimates the message vector Ŵ [K].
We measure reliability with the average probability of error P ne ≜ P
(
Ŵ [K] ̸= W [K]
)
.
Upon observing Z, the warden attempts to detect whether all K users transmitted
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covert messages (Hypothesis H1) or not (Hypothesis H0) by performing a hypothesis
test on Z. We denote the Type I (rejecting H0 when true) and Type II (accepting H0
when false) error probabilities by α and β, respectively. The warden can achieve any
pair (α, β) such that α+ β = 1 by ignoring his observation Z and basing his decision
on the result of a coin toss. We define the distribution induced at the warden when







W ⊗nZ|X[K] (z|xK (m[K], ℓ[K])) . (3.2)




, where Q⊗n∅ is
the distribution observed by the warden when none of the K users transmits any
covert information. We know from [70] that any test conducted by the warden on Z











. The primary objective of our covert communication scheme is




is negligible so that any statistical test used by the
warden on Z is futile.
Definition 1. The tuple r[K] ∈ RK+ is an achievable reliable and covert throughput
tuple2 if there exists a sequence of codes as defined above with increasing blocklength


















2We only consider communication schemes for which logMk grows to infinity, for k ∈ K, as n
grows to infinity.
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The covert capacity region of the K-user MAC consists of the closure of the set of
all achievable throughput tuples r[K]. A tuple s[K] ∈ RK+ , associated to an achievable
reliable and covert throughput tuple r[K], is an achievable key throughput tuple if for
all k ∈ K,













instead of n as traditionally done in information-theoretic problems. The normal-
ization by
√
n is essential to reflect the fact that covert communication corresponds
to a zero-rate regime, in which the number of bits scales sub-linearly with the num-






is also crucial to reflect




influences {logMk}k∈K. While the normalization might














plays the role of the usual “rate” in that it asymp-
totically does not depend on the blocklength n and already integrates the scaling. To
avoid confusion, we refer to rk as throughput instead of rate.
3.4 Preliminaries
Following the approach put forward in 2.3.1, we introduce a covert communication
process, which is an i.i.d. process indistinguishable from the innocent distribution
Q⊗n∅ in the limit. To recall, the rationale for introducing this process is to precisely
quantify the fraction of channel uses in which the users can transmit symbol 1 while
simultaneously avoiding detection by the warden, without introducing the coding




k∈K ρk = 1. We define the input distributions {ΠXk}k∈K on X by
ΠXk(1) = 1− ΠXk(0) = ρkαn. (3.6)
The output distributions at the legitimate receiver and the warden when the input






































(−1)|T |−|U| QU(z). (3.10)
Then, using Lemma 6 in Appendix 3.A, we write










k ρk = 1 is only made for convenience and, as we shall see from the converse
part of Theorem 2, without loss of generality.
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In the following lemma, we bound the KL divergence between Qαn and Q∅. Later, we
use the results of this lemma to show that for specific choices of the sequence {αn}n∈N∗ ,




Lemma 2. Let the sequence {αn}n⩾1 be such that limn→∞ αn = 0. Then, for n ∈ N∗











In addition, for all z ∈ Z, limn→∞ ζn(z) = ζ(z) and limn→∞ χn(ρ) = χ(ρ). Finally,














The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix 3.B. Assume that each transmitter
k ∈ K generates a sequence of length n using the process Π⊗nXk . The weight of these
sequences is ρknαn on average. To be indistinguishable from the innocent distribution











nD(Qαn∥Q∅) = 0. (3.16)
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Our assumptions in Section 3.3 ensure that χ (ρ) is non-zero. Consequently, from the
results of Lemma 2 and (3.16), we conclude that if we choose the sequence {αn}n∈N∗
such that limn→∞ nα2n = 0, our covert process Q⊗nαn is indistinguishable from Q
⊗n
∅ in
the limit. Consequently, we will construct a coding scheme that emulates the covert
process Q⊗nαn instead of Q
⊗n
∅ . The prime benefit of using Q
⊗n
αn instead of Q
⊗n
∅ is that Q
⊗n
αn
allows us to convey covert information through the use of 1 symbols. In particular,
it is possible to choose {αn}n∈N∗ such that limn→∞ nαn = ∞ so that the number of
information bits grows with n.
The square-root law follows from the constraint limn→∞ nα2n = 0, which forces
the scaling of nαn to be arbitrarily close to but not exceed
√
n. If χ(ρ) = 0 for






at least to the
order α3n in Lemma 2. In turn, we would only need to choose a sequence such that
limn→∞ nα3n = 0, effectively allowing the increase of the scaling of nαn to be arbitrarily
close to but not exceed n2/3 and beating the square root law. The assumption that
χ(ρ) > 0 made in Section 3.3 therefore excludes the (rare) situations in which the
square root law can be beaten.
3.5 Main result
We characterize the covert capacity region of a K-user binary-input MAC in Theo-
rem 2, with the achievability proof in Section 3.5.2 and the converse proof in Sec-
tion 3.5.3. The proofs adapt channel resolvability and converse techniques used in [27]
for point-to-point channels to the MACs. The achievability proof is an extension
of [27], and we provide details in the appendix; the converse proof presents more
challenges and is fully detailed.
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3.5.1 Covert capacity region of the K-user binary-input MAC
Theorem 2. For ρ ≜ {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]
K such that
∑























In addition, for any achievable reliable and covert throughput tuple r[K] on the bound-
ary of the covert capacity region characterized by ρ, the set of achievable key through-
put tuples is
{







Note that χ (ρ) in (3.17) is positive under the assumption made in Section 3.3, so
that the bounds in (3.18) and (3.19) are well defined and finite. A few remarks are
now in order.
• Our characterization of the covert capacity region only involves constraints
on individual user’s throughputs; there are no active constraints on the sum
throughput. However, the individual throughputs are not identical to those of
the single-user case [27], as there exists a non-trivial interplay among the ρk’s,
for k ∈ K, through χ(ρ) in (3.18).














Boundary of covert capacity region
Reliability constraint for (ρ 1 , ρ 2)
Covert constraint for (ρ 1 , ρ 2)
Achievable throughput region for (ρ 1 , ρ 2)
Figure 3.2: Representative example of the covert capacity region for a 2-user MAC.
The achievable rate region for a specific choice of ρ = ρ∗ = (ρ∗1, ρ∗2) is highlighted.
key only if
D(Pk∥P∅) ⩾ D(Qk∥Q∅), (3.20)
is satisfied; that is, no secret key is required for user k if the channel from user
k to the receiver is better than the channel to the warden when all other users
are silent.
• If the MAC is symmetric, in the sense that ∀z ∈ Z and ∀k ∈ K, Qk(z) = Q(z),
then
∑
k∈K ρk (Qk(z)−Q∅(z)) = Q(z)− Q∅(z), so that χ(ρ) is independent of
ρ and time sharing is optimal.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the covert capacity region for a 2-user MAC with randomly
generated channel matrices, WY |X1X2 and WZ|X1X2 , that satisfy (3.20) for k ∈ {1, 2}
and the absolute continuity requirements described in Section 3.3 for K = {1, 2}. The
thick solid curve denotes the boundary of the covert capacity region. All points on
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this boundary can be achieved by varying the values of (ρ1, ρ2). For ρ = ρ∗ ≜ (ρ∗1, ρ∗2),
the achievable covert throughput region is highlighted in Figure 3.2, where the square






















A non-empty intersection of the region to the top-right of the triangular marker and
the region to the bottom-left of the square marker implies the existence of keyless
covert communication schemes. If the regions do not intersect, a secret key is required
to communicate covertly. Note that, for a symmetric 2-user MAC, the boundary of
the covert capacity region is a straight line, and time sharing is optimal.
3.5.2 Achievability proof
We consider a communication scheme in which every user k employs Lk sub-codebooks,
each consisting of Mk codewords. The value of the key Sk ∈ J1, LkK chooses the sub-
codebook that user k uses to encode its message Wk ∈ J1,MkK. The decoder, which
possesses complete knowledge of the keys S[K], attempts to decode the messages sent
by the K transmitters. The idea underlying the scheme is to use channel resolvability
techniques to ensure that the total number of codewords is sufficiently large to keep
the warden confused, while simultaneously ensuring that each sub-codebook is small
enough for the receiver to reliably decode the messages.
Proposition 1. Let ρ ≜ {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]K with
∑
k∈K ρk = 1. Let {αn}n∈N∗ be such
that αn ∈ (0, 1), limn→∞ nαn = ∞, and limn→∞ nα2n = 0. For the channel model
described in Section 3.3, for an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1), there exist covert communication
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schemes such that ∀k ∈ K,









ρk [(1 + µ)D(Qk∥Q∅)− (1− µ)D(Pk∥P∅)]+ , (3.22)
lim
n→∞








Proof. To prove Proposition 1, we rely on random coding arguments for channel
reliability and channel resolvability. However, the use of low-weight codewords in our
communication scheme requires that we handle concentration inequalities carefully.
Since basic concentration inequalities do not apply in the low-weight regime [27],
we use Bernstein’s inequality to establish our random coding arguments. The proof
follows otherwise along the lines of [27, Theorem 2].
Random codebook generation At each transmitter k ∈ K, generate MkLk code-
words xk (mk, ℓk) ∈ X n, where (mk, ℓk) ∈ J1,MkK× J1, LkK, independently at random
according to the distribution Π⊗nXk . For a set T ⊂ K, define
W ⊗nY |X[T ] (y|x[T ]) ≜
∑
x[T c]






Note that W ⊗nY |X[T ] is a product distribution since each user k ∈ K generates its
codeword according to an n-fold product distribution Π⊗nXk . Also, note that if T = ∅,
W ⊗nY |X[T ] = P
⊗n







(x[K],y) ∈ X n[K]× Yn : log
W ⊗nY |X[K] (y|x[K])





where γT ≜ (1− µ)nI(X[T ];Y |X[T c]) for every non-empty set T ⊆ K and an arbi-
trary µ ∈ (0, 1). Encoder k ∈ K uses the key Sk = ℓk to map the message Wk = mk
onto the codeword xk (mk, ℓk). The codewords are then transmitted through the
memoryless MAC to the legitimate receiver. The decoder, which observes y and has
complete knowledge of the keys ℓ[K], operates as follows.
• If there exists a unique m[K] ∈ ×Kk=1J1,MkK such that (xK (m[K], ℓ[K]) ,y) ∈
Anγ , output Ŵ [K] = m[K],
• Else, declare a decoding error.
Channel reliability analysis The decoding error probability P ne averaged over all
random codebooks satisfies the following.
Lemma 3. For any µ ∈ (0, 1), an n large enough, and
logMk = (1− µ) ρknαnD(Pk∥P∅), (3.27)
for every k ∈ K, the probability of decoding error averaged over all random codebooks
satisfies
E (P ne ) ⩽ exp (−ξnαn) , (3.28)
for an appropriate ξ > 0.
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix 3.D.
Channel resolvability analysis In the following lemma, we show that the KL di-
vergence between the induced distribution and the covert stochastic process averaged
over all random codebooks vanishes in the limit.
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Lemma 4. For any µ ∈ (0, 1), an n large enough, and
logMkLk = (1 + µ) ρknαnD(Qk∥Q∅), (3.29)








⩽ exp (−ξnαn) , (3.30)
for an appropriate ξ > 0.
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix 3.E.
Identification of a specific code Using Markov’s inequality, we obtain
P
(













Then, we conclude that there must exist at least one coding scheme such that for
appropriate constants ξ1, ξ2 > 0 and an n large enough, we have





⩽ exp (−ξ2nαn) . (3.33)
Lemma 5. For n large enough and an appropriate constant ξ3 > 0,






The proof of Lemma 5 is provided in Appendix 3.F. Using (3.14), (3.32), (3.34),
and our choice of {αn}n∈N∗ , we conclude that there exists at least one coding scheme
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αn)χn(ρ)− exp (−ξ3nαn) . (3.35)









































ρk [(1 + µ)D(Qk∥Q∅)− (1− µ)D(Pk∥P∅)]+ . (3.38)
Since µ in (3.21) is arbitrary, we conclude from Proposition 1 that the covert













In addition, any achievable covert throughput tuple r [K] that is characterized by a
specific ρ and lies on the boundary of the region defined in (3.39) is associated with










Proposition 2. For the channel model described in Section 3.3, consider a sequence
of covert communication schemes with increasing blocklength n ∈ N∗ characterized by




such that limn→∞ ϵn = 0 and limn→∞ δn = 0. Then,
there exists a vector ρ ≜ {ρk}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]
K with
∑
k∈K ρk = 1 and an infinite subset























for all k ∈ K.
Proof. Consider a sequence of covert communication schemes with increasing block-




, and logMk takes the
maximum value such that limn→∞ logMk = ∞ for all k ∈ K. Each user k transmits
an n−length codeword Xk = (Xk1, Xk2, . . . , Xkn) ∈ X n, where n ∈ N∗, to the re-







1{Xkj(mk, ℓk) = x}
MkLk
. (3.42)
We define ΠXkj(1) = 1−ΠXkj(0) ≜ µ
(n)
kj . Note that µ
(n)
kj depends on n, the transmitter
index k, and the symbol position j. For every n ∈ N∗, we define a permutation π(n)k∗
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of J1, nK to define a new code such that
(k∗, 1) = arg max
(k,j)∈K×J1,nKµ(n)kj . (3.43)
Since the channel is memoryless, the performance of the new code that satisfies (3.43)
matches that of the original code. Hence, without loss of generality, we only study
the sequence of codes for which (3.43) holds for every n ∈ N∗. Note that the sequence{
{µ(n)k1 }k∈K
}
n∈N∗ belongs to [0, 1]
K which is a closed and bounded set. Hence, we can




n∈N ∗ , where N
∗ ⊆ N∗ is an infinite set,
with limit {µ∗k1}k∈K. Let us now assume that the sequence {µ∗k1}k∈K ∈ [0, 1]
K is not
an all-zero sequence.
For j ∈ J1, nK, we denote the K-length vector {xkj}k∈K by x(j)[K]. The warden
makes an observation Z of length n, whose distribution is denoted by Q̂n. For j ∈




































where (a) follows from the definition of QT (z) ≜ WZ|X[K](z|xT ) in (3.1). Alternatively,
using Lemma 6 in the appendix, we write





















































where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. Since limn→∞ δn =















0, which implies that ∀z ∈ Z,
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣Q̂j(z)−Q∅(z)∣∣∣ = 0, (3.54)
lim
n→∞
Q̂j(z) = Q∅(z). (3.55)




























QT (z) = Q∅(z). (3.57)
Since we assumed that the sequence {µ∗k1}k∈K is not an all-zero sequence, (3.57)
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implies that Q∅ is a convex combination of {QT }T ⊆K: T ̸=∅. Note that the convex
combination in (3.57) does not require the transmitters to coordinate, which is the
case in our channel model, since the input from each user is independent of the inputs
from other users. Since (3.57) contradicts the assumption made in Section 3.3, our






k1 = 0, (3.58)






k∗1 = 0. (3.59)






kj = 0, (3.60)
for all (k, j) ∈ K×J1, nK. Henceforth, we only consider the subsequence of codes with
blocklength n ∈ N ∗. Next, for j ∈ J1, nK, define
Ψ
(n)










j (z) = 0 for all j ∈ J1, nK and ∀z ∈ Z. We lower bound D(Q̂j∥Q∅) for















































































where (a) follows from the inequality log (1 + x) > x− x2
2
















ξ(n)(z) ≜ maxj∈J1,nK ξ(n)j (z). Since limn→∞ Ψ(n)j (z) = 0, we have limn→∞ ξ(n)j (z) = 0
for all j ∈ J1, nK. From (3.47) and (3.61), for j ∈ J1, nK, we write

















where (a) follows from (3.43) and the fact that µ(n)kj ∈ [0, 1] for all k ∈ K and j ∈J1, nK. Note that the term inside the parentheses in (3.68) is positive and bounded.
Consequently, for z ∈ Z,
max
j∈J1,nK


















4Note that for n large enough, we can ensure that Ψ(n)j (z) ∈
[
− 12 , 0
]
if Ψ(n)j (z) < 0 since
































Note that, by definition, ξ(n)j (z) is non-negative irrespective of the sign of Ψ
(n)
j (z).
Then, using (3.59) and (3.75), we conclude that limn→∞
n∈N ∗
ξ(n)(z) = 0. Using (3.65),































For k ∈ K, we upper bound logMk using standard techniques,
logMk
(a)
⩽ I(Wk;YSk) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logMk (3.78)
⩽ I(WkSk;Y) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logMk (3.79)
= I(Xk;Y) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logMk (3.80)
= H(Xk)−H(Xk|Y) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logMk (3.81)
(b)
⩽ H(Xk|X [K \ {k}])−H(Xk|YX [K \ {k}]) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logMk (3.82)
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= I(Xk;Y|X [K \ {k}]) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logMk (3.83)






















Xkj;Yj|X(j) [K \ {k}]
)
+Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logMk, (3.86)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the fact that Xk and
X[K\{k}] are mutually independent and the fact that conditioning reduces entropy,
and (c) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and the memoryless
property of the channel. We expand the mutual information term in (3.86) as
I
(
































WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xT [K \ {k}])
P∅(y)
. (3.88)
Defining µ(n)max ≜ µ(n)k∗1 and d1 ≜ 2K maxT ⊆K:|T |>1D(PT ∥P∅), we upper bound the first

















































where (a) follows from splitting the sum into two based on the number of 1′s in xT ,


































ΠXkj(x)WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]Xkj (y|xT [K\{k}]x)
× log



























































































where (a) follows from the fact that
∑
x
ΠXkj(x)WYj |X(j)[K\{k}]Xkj (y|xT [K\{k}]x) = WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xT [K \ {k}]) ,
(3.99)
and (b) follows from the fact that
∏
i′∈K\{i,k}
















We define d3 ≜
∣∣∣∑y (P{i,k}(y)− Pi(y)) log Pi(y)P∅(y) ∣∣∣. Note that d3 is bounded since Pi ≪






























⩾ D(Pi∥P∅)− d3µ(n)max. (3.103)
Defining d4 ≜ d1+d2+d3 and combining (3.88), (3.90), (3.98), and (3.103), we obtain






Next, we normalize logMk, where k ∈ K, by
√
nδn. Using (3.77), (3.86), and (3.104),
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is positive for n large
enough, our application of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in (3.108) is valid. From the


































































































which is positive for n large enough. Consequently, combining (3.108), (3.112)

















































































Combining (3.86) and (3.104) with the fact that limn→∞
n∈N ∗


















is bounded between 0 and













N † ⊆ N ∗ is an infinite set, with limit ρa. Note that
∑
a∈K ρa = 1. Since we have
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assumed in Section 3.3 that there exists no {ρk}k∈K for which
∑
k∈K ρkQk(z) = Q∅(z)
for all z ∈ Z, the denominator in (3.115) is non-zero. Henceforth, we only consider
























where (a) follows from the definition of χ(ρ).
Using standard techniques, we lower bound logMkLk, for k ∈ K, by




= I(X[K];Z)− I(X [K \ {k}] ;Z|Xk), (3.121)
where (a) follows from the fact that Xk is a function of Wk and Sk. Defining d6 ≜
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ij − δn, (3.127)







WZj |X(j)[K\{k}]Xkj (z|xT [K \ {k}]x) = WZj |Xkj(z|x).
(3.128)
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We upper bound the second term in (3.121) by





























































































































where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and the memoryless





















































































⩽ 1 for any T ⊆ K. Then,
from Corollary 1, we write














Defining d8 ≜ 2K max
T ⊆K\{k}:T ̸=∅
∣∣∣∣∣∑z ∑U⊆T (−1)|T |−|U| QU∪{k}(z) log Qk(z)Q∅(z)
∣∣∣∣∣ and using (3.141),
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⩾ D(Qk∥Q∅)− d8µ(n)max. (3.145)
Defining d9 ≜ d7 + d8 and combining (3.136), (3.140), and (3.145), we obtain






































































































Consider a sequence of codes for which (3.117) holds with equality for all k ∈ K.
Proposition 1 confirms the existence of such schemes. As a result, for an arbitrary
































































































































Letting ξ ↓ 0 in (3.157), we obtain (3.41).




an ⩽ lim infn→∞
n∈N
an ⩽ lim sup
n→∞
n∈N
an ⩽ lim sup
n→∞
an. (3.158)
From Proposition 2 and equation (3.158), we conclude that the covert capacity region













and that, any achievable covert throughput tuple r [K] characterized by a specific ρ
and lying on the boundary of the region defined in (3.159) is associated to an achiev-
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ρk [D(Qk∥Q∅)− D(Pk∥P∅)]+ for each k ∈ K.
The main reason why we need to resort to this approach is because, unlike traditional
converse proofs, we require some statement about the limit of µ(n)k1 , which is a much
more precise statement about the structure of the code than usually required. Tradi-
tional converse proofs single-letterize quantities such as entropy, mutual information,
without having to make explicit statements about the distribution induced by the
code. Part of the challenge is that it is not obvious a priori that quantities such as
µk1 behave nicely and our proof requires us to make statements about the limiting
behavior of these quantities. In essence, our approach is a way of only focusing on
“well-behaved codes” in the sequence. Mathematically, our approach is justified by
properties of lim inf and lim sup.
3.6 Conclusion
We conclude with a discussion of extensions of our results and related problems of
interest. Although we have limited our characterization of the covert capacity region
to binary-input K-user MACs, our results also extend to transmitters with non-binary
input alphabets as in [27, 33]. To be more specific, each user is now characterized by a
distinct input alphabet Xk ≜ J0, NkK with one innocent symbol 0 and Nk information
symbols. The input distributions defined earlier in the chapter need to be suitably
modified as follows.
ΠXk(0) = 1− ρkαn,∀k and (3.160)




i∈J1,NkK βk,i = 1. We need to introduce a new notation to describe the distri-




Xi Qx(z) = WZ|X[K](z|x). (3.162)
As done before, for a given vector x, the vector x[T ] is the subvector of size |T |
comprised of the components of x with index in T . In addition xT = (xT ,1, . . . , xT ,K)
is a K length vector which contains the symbol 0 in positions indexed by T c. For



















In the special case that T is a singleton, say {k}, we simply write Qk in place of QT ,
and if the unique non-zero symbol in xT is i ∈ J1, NkK, we write Qk,i in place of QxT .

























Similar notation holds when focusing on the main channel instead of the warden
channel, in which case we write P instead of Q. With this notation, one can check























Notice that while χ(ρ) only depends on the distributions {Qk}k∈K, the expansion of
the mutual information involves distributions {Qk,i}, which effectively forces us to
keep track of the {βk,i}. It is then not too painful to check that the covert capacity


















For the converse part, one can define





1{Xkj(mk, ℓk) = 0}
MkLk
, (3.171)






in which case the steps leading to the lower bound of the KL divergence are identical,
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thanks to our redefinition of QT and Qk done earlier. The steps leading to the upper























WYj |X(j)[K\{k}] (y|xT [K \ {k}])
P∅(y)
, (3.173)
to account for multiple information symbols. Checking how this affects the remaining
calculations requires additional care, but one can check that we obtain a modified
version of (3.104) of the form


















Following the exact same steps earlier in the chapter, one obtains the converse match-
ing the achievability region highlighted earlier. The analysis of the least achievable
key rates on the boundary follows similarly.
Our results do extend to AWGN channels. If covertness were to be measured
with variational distance and if one were to use on-off-keying, one could follow the
approach outlined in [71] and handle the covert constraint as done in our achievabil-
ity proof. However, since our results focus on KL divergence to measure covertness,
an achievability proof must accommodate the continuous nature of the AWGN chan-
nel alphabet and possibly the need to use input distributions that are not discrete
(see [33]). One solution is to use a resolvability exponent approach [72], [73], [74]
instead of the typical-sequence approach used in this chapter to obtain bounds for




that do not depend on the alphabet cardinality. One
technical aspect of this approach is that one must perform a careful Taylor series of
the resolvability exponent. As for the converse part, one can follow the steps used
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in [33] with the necessary adaptations to handle multiple users. More specifically,

























Because Zj and the channel inputs {Xi,j} are independent (by definition), we have






Since a Gaussian distribution maximizes the differential entropy among all variables


































Since we can argue as done in this chapter that every
∑













































Note that the last step should be argued a bit more carefully but is nevertheless
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Reproducing the reasoning in this chapter to deal with all the terms properly, we






{{rk}k∈K : rk ⩽ ρk} . (3.25)
A final problem of interest is the characterization of the covert capacity region of
a K-user MAC in which the transmitters share a common key. Unlike the situation
addressed here, the common key scenario captures the ability of users to coordinate
their covert transmissions. One can approach the problem by following cooperative
channel resolvability techniques studied in [75, 76].
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APPENDIX
3.A Alternative representation of Qαn in Eq. (3.11)
Lemma 6. For any set S ⊆ K, define GS(z) ≜
∑
T ⊆S (−1)
|S|−|T | QT (z). Then,









Proof. First, we prove the following statement by induction. For any set S and
βk ∈ [0, 1] for k ∈ K,
∏
k∈S
























= 1− β1 − β2 + β1β2. (3.29)
We assume that (3.27) is true for the set S ≜ J1, K − 1K, where K ∈ N∗. Then, for
the set S ′ ≜ S ∪ {K}, we have
∏
k∈S′






































































































































































































































































































































(−1)|S|−|T | QT (z)
)
, (3.47)
where (a) follows from (3.27). Defining GS(z) ≜
∑
T ⊆S (−1)
|S|−|T | QT (z), we obtain









Corollary 1. For any set S ⊆ K, define GS(z) ≜
∑
T ⊆S (−1)
|S|−|T | QT (z). Then,













3.B Proof of Lemma 2










































































where, (a) follows from the fact that
∑
z ζn(z) = 0 from the definition of ζn. Since

































































where, (a) follows from the inequalities log (1 + x) > x− x2
2












, and (b) follows from the fact that
∑
z ζn(z) = 0. For n












From the definition of Qαn , we have































where (a) follows from the fact that limn→∞ αn = 0. From (3.61) and the definition
















Finally, for a non-empty set T ⊆ K, define λn,T (z) ≜ WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ])−Q∅(z)αn . Note that∑











WZ|X[T ] (z|x[T ]) log
(













WZ|X[T ] (z|x[T ]) log
(


















WZ|X[T ] (z|xU [T ]) log
(































WZ|X[T ] (z|x∅ [T ]) log
(




































































































































where (a) follows from splitting the first term in (3.64) into three based on the number
of users sending symbol 1, and (b) follows from the fact that the second term in (3.66)









Lemma 7. Let {Ui}ni=1 be independent zero-mean random variables such that |Ui| ⩽ c



















3.D Proof of Lemma 3
The K users encode messages W [K] = m[K] using keys S[K] = ℓ[K] into codewords
xK (m[K], ℓ[K]) and transmit them over a discrete memoryless MAC. The following
two events lead to a decoding error.
• The transmitted codewords do not satisfy (xK (m[K], ℓ[K]) ,y) ∈ Anγ .





(XK (m[K], ℓ[K]) ,Y) ∈ Anγ
}
. (3.73)
The probability of decoding error at the legitimate receiver averaged over all random
codebooks is given by
E (P ne ) = P
(












































































































W ⊗nY |X[K] (Y|X[K])




















WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])









c and the union bound. Define
a zero-mean5 random variable UT ≜ I(X[T ];Y |X[T c]) − log WY |X[K](Y |X[K])WY |X[T c](Y |X[T c]) . Note








WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])
WY |X[T c] (Y |X[T c])
)
− (I (X[T ];Y |X[T c]))2 . (3.82)
5since E
(
log WY |X[K](Y |X[K])WY |X[T c](Y |X[T c])
)
= I(X[T ];Y |X[T c]).
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WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])











WY |X[K] (y|x[K]) log2
WY |X[K] (y|x[K])












WY |X[K] (y|x[K]) log2
WY |X[K] (y|x[K])





























WY |X[T c] (y|x∅[T c])
P∅(y)
+O (αn) , (3.86)
where (a) follows from splitting the first sum on the right hand side of (3.83) into
two based on whether x [K] equals x∅ [K] or not, (b) follows from the fact that the
first term in (3.84) is on the order of αn since at least one of the symbols in x [K]
is a 1, and (c) follows from the expansion of the product term and the fact that
log2 P∅(y)
WY |X[T c](y|x∅[T c])
= log2 WY |X[T c](y|x∅[T
c])
P∅(y)
. Expanding the numerator in the log2
term in (3.86), we obtain







WY |X[T c]X[T ] (y|x∅ [T c]x [T ]) (3.87)
=
∑













= P∅(y) +O (αn) , (3.89)
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where (a) follows from the fact that the first term in (3.88) is on the order of αn since
at least one of the symbols in x [T ] is a 1 and from the expansion of the product term.




WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])













= O (αn) , (3.91)
where (a) follows from using the Taylor series of the log term. Let us now analyze
the mutual information term on the right hand side of (3.82).






















where (a) follows from Lemma 2. Using the definition of γT , for an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1),




























WY |X[K] (Y |X[K])

























(µnI(X[T ];Y |X[T c]))2









⩽ exp (−c2nαn) , (3.99)
for appropriate constants c, c1, c2 > 0, where (a) follows from using Bernstein’s in-
equality, and (b) follows from the fact that, for a finite K, there exist 2K−1 non-empty
subsets of K. Denoting the |T |-length vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) by 1[T ] for any non-empty
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xT (m̃[T ],ℓ[T ])




Π⊗nXk (xk (1, ℓk))
)(∏
k∈T

















xT c (1[T c],ℓ[T c])
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where (a) follows from rewriting the left hand side of (3.100) in terms of the positions
in which the two vectors m [K] and m̃ [K] do not match, (b) follows from setting
m [K] = 1 [K] without loss of generality, and (c) follows from the fact that Anγ in the
indicator function of (3.102) is a subset of AnγT in the indicator function of (3.103)
by definition of Anγ . Combining (3.99) and (3.105), we upper bound (3.76) by









+ exp (−c2nαn) . (3.106)
Using the definition of γT , (3.94) and (3.106), we conclude that for an arbitrary
δ ∈ (0, 1) and n large enough, if
∑
k∈T




for every non-empty set T ⊆ K, then there exists a constant ξ > 0 such that
E (P ne ) ⩽ exp (−ξnαn) . (3.108)
If T is a singleton set {k}, where k ∈ K, it follows from (3.107) that
logMk = (1− δ) (1− µ) ρknαnD(Pk∥P∅). (3.109)
Observing (3.107) and (3.109), we conclude that (3.107) is automatically satisfied for
every non-empty set T ⊆ K, if logMk satisfies (3.109) for every k ∈ K.
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3.E Proof of Lemma 4







(x[T ], z) ∈ X n[T ]×Zn : log






ηT ≜ (1 + µ)nI(X[T ];Z), (3.111)
for every non-empty set T ⊆ K and an arbitrary µ > 0. For every (m[K], ℓ[K]) ∈









. Let us analyze the KL






























































































m̃[T c]:m̃k ̸=mk,∀k∈T c
∑
ℓ̃[T c]:ℓ̃k ̸=ℓk,∀k∈T c
∑
xT c(m̃[T c],ℓ̃[T c])
WZ|X[T ]X[T c]
(
z|xT (m [T ] , ℓ [T ])xT c
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T ⊆K: T ̸=∅
∑
m̃[T c]:m̃k ̸=mk,∀k∈T c
∑
ℓ̃[T c]:ℓ̃k ̸=ℓk,∀k∈T c
∑
xT c(m̃[T c],ℓ̃[T c])
WZ|X[T ]X[T c]
(
z|xT (m [T ] , ℓ [T ])xT c
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1{(xK (m[K], ℓ[K]) , z) ̸∈ Bnη} ,
(3.119)
where (a) follows from splitting the numerator term in (3.115) into two based on
















= Q⊗nαn (z) .
(3.120)








































































































(xK (m[K], ℓ[K]) , z) ̸∈ Bnη
}
, (3.126)
where (a) follows from the fact that we can upper bound both W
⊗n




and Q⊗nαn(z) by 1 and (b) follows from the fact that there only exist 2K − 1 non-empty



































) + n log( 2K∏































c and the application of the union
bound. We define a zero-mean random variable VT ≜ log WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])Qαn (Z) − I(X[T ];Z)
since E
(
log WZ|X[T ](Z|X[T ])
Qαn (Z)
)






















































































WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ]) log2
Qαn(z)
WZ|X[T ](z|x∅[T ])
+O (αn) , (3.135)
where (a) follows from splitting the term on the right hand side of (3.132) into two
based on whether x [T ] = x∅ [T ] or not, (b) follows from the fact that at least one of
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the symbols in x [T ] in the second term in (3.133) is the symbol 1, and (c) follows












x[T ] ̸=x∅[T ]











= WZ|X[T ](z|x∅ [T ]) +O (αn) . (3.138)


















= O (αn) , (3.140)
where (a) follows from the application of the Taylor series of the log term. Using
































































⩽ exp (−c2nαn) , (3.146)
for appropriate constants c, c1, c2 > 0, where (a) follows from using Bernstein’s in-
equality, and (b) follows from the fact that I (X[T ];Z) =
∑
k∈T ρkαnD(Qk∥Q∅) +
O (α2n), for any non-empty set T ⊆ K, from Lemma 2. Combining (3.128) and (3.146),













) + exp (−c3nαn) . (3.147)
Using the definition of ηT , we conclude from (3.147) that for an arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1)
and a large n, if
∑
k∈T











⩽ exp (−ξnαn) . (3.149)
If T is a singleton set {k}, where k ∈ K, it follows from (3.148) that
log(MkLk) = (1 + δ) (1 + µ) ρknαnD(Qk∥Q∅). (3.150)
Observing (3.148) and (3.150), we conclude that (3.148) is automatically satisfied for
every non-empty set T ⊆ K, if logMkLk satisfies (3.150) for every k ∈ K.
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Defining νmin ≜ minz Q∅(z), we bound the second term on the right hand side





































































































EMBEDDING COVERT INFORMATION IN INNOCENT
TRANSMISSIONS
4.1 Summary
In this chapter, we analyze a two-receiver binary-input discrete memoryless broadcast
channel, in which the transmitter communicates a common message simultaneously
to both receivers and a covert message to only one of them. The unintended re-
cipient of the covert message is treated as an adversary who attempts to detect the
covert transmission. This model captures the problem of embedding covert messages
in an innocent codebook and generalizes previous covert communication models in
which the innocent behavior corresponds to the absence of communication between
legitimate users. We identify the exact asymptotic behavior of the number of covert
bits that can be transmitted when the rate of the innocent codebook is close to the
capacity of the channel to the adversary. Our results also identify the dependence of
the number of covert bits on the channel parameters and the characteristics of the
innocent codebook.
4.2 Introduction
As is customary, much of the literature on LPD communication define an innocent
behavior in which the transmitter does not communicate. In contrast, in this chapter,
we analyze a scenario in which the innocent behavior corresponds to the transmission
of codewords from an innocent codebook that is permitted and decoded by the ad-
versary. Since the definition of stealth communication is deceptively similar to that
of covert communication, it is important to note the difference between them. Covert
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communication, which is governed by the square-root law, is an extreme regime in
which the adversary possesses the exact same knowledge as any other receiver ex-
cept the secret key, if any. Hence, the adversary also knows the channel to expect
when there is no input. However, in stealth communication, the adversary expects
one channel when the true channel is another, and the stealth transmitter takes
advantage of this to transmit with a linear rate. The work of Dutta et al. [77] on
covert communication using dirty constellations is one of the motivations for our work
in this chapter. In [77], the authors rely on channel noise to hide a covert signal by
superimposing it on top of an innocent signal while incurring minimal distortion; con-
sequently, the informed receiver can decode the covert message while the uninformed
adversary attributes the distortion of the signal to channel impairments and hard-
ware imperfections. Although the authors show that their message-hiding scheme is
immune to certain statistical tests, their scheme is not fundamentally covert against a
more powerful adversary. Our objective is to develop an information-theoretic anal-
ysis of embedding covert signals in innocent communication signals while escaping
detection from an adversary who is not restricted to using a small set of statistical
tests.
We model the setup of [77] as a two-user discrete memoryless broadcast channel in
which a common message is sent to both users while a covert message is sent to only
one user, treating the other as an adversary. This can be viewed as an instance of
steganography [8], in which the covertext is controlled in part through the design of a
coding scheme and in part through the channel noise that is only statistically known.
The model that is closest to the one considered in this chapter is that of [35], which
analyzes the same broadcast setup for BSCs and exploits the additive nature of the
noise in BSCs. Our results generalize [35] using different proof techniques. Another
related but different model is that of [78] in which the transmitter simultaneously
sends two different covert messages to two legitimate users while escaping detection
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from a third user. The authors have shown that time-division transmission is then
optimal in certain cases. Although there exist technical and conceptual connections
between our model and that of [78], our model captures a different problem and the
results cannot be directly compared.
We build upon the channel resolvability techniques developed in [27, 69] for point-
to-point channels and MACs, respectively, to embed covert information into innocent
transmissions. As expected, we show that the transmitter can perturb no more than
O (
√
n) symbols of the n-length sequences representing the innocent transmission to
be covert from the adversary. We precisely characterize the asymptotic behavior of
the number of covert bits that can be transmitted when the rate of the innocent
transmission approaches the capacity of the channel to the adversary. Our results
highlight the dependence of the number of covert bits on the channel parameters and
the characteristics of the innocent codebook.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.3, we formally
introduce our channel model, and in Section 4.4, we develop a preliminary result
that captures the essence of our approach to embedding covert information in inno-
cent transmissions. We present our main result in Section 4.5, which consists in an
achievability and a converse characterizing the optimal asymptotic number of reli-
able and covert bits when the rate of the common message is close to the capacity
of the channel to the adversary. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 4.6 with a
brief discussion about extending our result to non-binary input alphabets. Proofs of
lemmas are relegated to the appendix. This chapter is based on the results obtained
in [79, 80].
4.3 Channel model
We analyze a channel model in which Alice, the transmitter, communicates a common





















Figure 4.1: Model of covert communication over a discrete memoryless broadcast
channel for a fixed common message W2 = j.
to Bob alone over a discrete memoryless broadcast channel
(
X ,WY Z|X ,Y ,Z
)
. We
assume that the transmitter uses a binary input alphabet X ≜ {0, 1} and that the
output alphabets Y and Z are finite. Furthermore, we assume that all terminals are
synchronized and possess complete knowledge of the coding scheme used.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, Alice wishes to communicate a uniformly distributed
common message W2 ∈ J1,M2K to both Bob and Willie, and a uniformly distributed
covert message W1 ∈ J1,M1K to Bob alone in n channel uses. Alice may also choose
not to transmit any covert message, in which case, she sets W1 = 0. Note that
there is no prior on whether W1 = 0 or W1 ̸= 0. Alice then encodes the message
pair (W1,W2) = (i, j) into an n-length codeword Xij. We label the collection of
codewords {X0j}M2j=1 as the innocent codebook. Alice sends the codeword over the
discrete memoryless broadcast channel in n channel uses, at the end of which, Bob
and Willie observe the n-length sequences Y and Z, respectively. Since the channel
is memoryless, we denote the transition probability corresponding to n uses of the
channel by W ⊗nY Z|X ≜
∏n
i=1WY Z|X . For a ∈ X , we denote the output distributions
induced by each input symbol at Bob and Willie by Pa(y) ≜ WY |X(y|a) and Qa(z) ≜
WZ|X(z|a), respectively. For a, b ∈ X with a ̸= b, we assume Pa ≪ Pb, Qa ≪ Qb,
Qa ̸= Qb. Without the first assumption, Bob has an unfair advantage over Willie [27].
Without the second and third assumptions, achieving covert communication is either






to Willie admits a unique capacity-achieving input
distribution Λ, for which Λ(1) ≜ λ∗, where λ∗ > 0. Many channels encountered









, so that Willie limits the rate of the common mes-
sage.
Upon observing the noisy sequence Z, Willie forms an estimate W̃2 of W2. We
























W̃2 ̸= j|W1 ̸= 0,W2 = j
)
. (4.2)
Willie attempts to detect the presence of a non-zero covert message by perform-
ing a binary-hypothesis test on his observation Z to distinguish between hypotheses
H0 ≜ {W1 = 0} and H1 ≜ {W1 ̸= 0}. We denote Willie’s Type I and Type II error
probabilities by α and β, respectively. For a fixed W2 = j, the output distribution
observed by Willie is






W ⊗nZ|X (z|xij) , otherwise. (4.4)





. Note that any statistical test [28] conducted on Z by Willie






. Using Pinsker’s inequality [26], we write
1Note that this assumption is only required to prove the converse.
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. Consequently , a vanishing KL divergence ensures that
α + β = 1 in the limit so that Willie’s statistical test is no better than a random
guess.
Upon observing Y, Bob forms an estimate (Ŵ1, Ŵ2) of the transmitted message















































Ŵ2 ̸= j|W1 ̸= 0,W2 = j
)
. (4.8)
Definition 2. A code for the above model is an (M1,M2, n, ϵ, δ) code if P (1)e ⩽ ϵ,
P
(2)




⩽ δ for all j ∈ J1,M2K.
Note that P (1)e and P (2)e are not usual average error probabilities because our
model does not impose a prior on whether Alice embeds a covert message or not.
Nevertheless, one can check from the definition that a small values of P (1)e and P (2)e
guarantee that the average error probability of Bob and Willie is small. Also note





for every j ∈ J1,M2K so that the hypothesis test used by Willie is futile in detecting
the presence of any covert message for every choice of the common message and not
just on average.
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Definition 3. A throughput/rate pair (r1, r2) is achievable if there exists a sequence
of (M1,M2, n, ϵn, δn) codes2 with increasing blocklength n such that for all j ∈ J1,M2K,

















δn = 0. (4.11)
The optimal covert throughput is the supremum of all covert throughputs r1 that can
be achieved when the common message is transmitted at a rate close to the capacity
of the channel to Willie.
A couple of comments are now in order. First, note that our goal is twofold here.
• We wish to design a reliable code to communicate a common message and a
reliable code to embed a covert message; this is a joint code-design problem,
and we do not address the problem of embedding covert bits into a fixed code
for the common message.
• Our problem generalizes previous works on covert communication, in which
covertness was measured w.r.t. the innocent distribution Q⊗n0 corresponding to
the transmission of the all-zero sequence. In our case, for W2 = j ∈ J1,M2K,
covertness is measured w.r.t. the distribution Qnj , which is a product distribution
that is not identically distributed and corresponds to the communication of the
innocent codeword mapped to the common message W2 = j.
2Note that we only consider communication schemes for which limn→∞ logM1 = ∞.
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Figure 4.1: Binary asymmetric channel VX|X and an illustration of innocent symbols
flipped by the channel VX|X .
4.4 Preliminaries
Similar to our approach in Chapter 3, we define a covert stochastic process, which
serves as the target distribution that our covert code approximates. In this case,
by introducing the covert process, we precisely quantify the fraction of symbols in
the innocent codeword that Alice can perturb to transmit covert information while
simultaneously avoiding detection by Willie.
For a fixed n ∈ N∗ and a sequence x ∈ X n, we define the covert process as
the output of the binary asymmetric channel VX|X illustrated in Figure 4.1 such that
VX|X(1|0) ≜ αn and VX|X(0|1) ≜ βn, where αn, βn ∈ (0, 1) are cross-over probabilities.




VX|X (xi|xi) . (4.12)
We set γn ≜ βnαn , and when defining a sequence {γn}n∈N∗ , we ask that it converges to








W ⊗nZ|X (z|x)Πx,αn,βn(x), (4.14)
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at Bob and Willie, respectively. Note that both P ⊗nx,αn,βn and Q
⊗n
x,αn,βn are product
distributions, and setting both cross-over probabilities, αn and βn, to 0 results in a
distribution Q⊗nx,0,0 at Willie. We now have the following generalization of [27, Lemma
1].
Lemma 8. Let αn, βn ∈ (0, 1) be such that limn→∞ αn = limn→∞ βn = 0. Let x ∈ X n






















































The proof of Lemma 8 is provided in Appendix 4.A. For any x, upon choosing











which implies Q⊗nx,αn,βn is indistinguishable from Q
⊗n
x,0,0 at Willie. In addition, it is
also possible to simultaneously choose sequences {αn}n∈N∗ and {βn}n∈N∗ such that
limn→∞ nαn = limn→∞ nβn = ∞ to flip an infinite number of innocent symbols as
n → ∞, while still ensuring that Q⊗nx,αn,βn is indistinguishable from Q
⊗n
x,0,0 according
to (4.15). If we set x = x0j, where x0j is the innocent codeword corresponding
to W2 = j, the distribution Q⊗nx0j ,0,0 is the innocent distribution corresponding to




We now characterize the exact scaling of the number of covert bits when the common
message is transmitted at a rate approaching the capacity of the channel to Willie.
Also, for the transmission of covert bits without a secret key, Bob is required to pos-
sess a certain advantage over Willie, which we precisely characterize in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. For the channel model described in Section 4.3, if there exists a γ ⩾ 0
such that
(1− λ∗)D(P1∥P0) + λ∗γD(P0∥P1) > (1− λ∗)D(Q1∥Q0) + λ∗γD(Q0∥Q1), (4.17)





2 ((1− λ∗)D(P1∥P0) + λ∗γD(P0∥P1))√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1∥Q0) + λ∗γ2χ2 (Q0∥Q1)
, (4.18)





where the maximum in (4.18) is over all γ that satisfy (4.17), is achievable.3
Proof. We first show that Bob can decode the covert message, and both Bob and
Willie can decode the common message reliably. Using channel resolvability tech-
niques, we then show that the induced distribution Q̂nW2 corresponding to the common
message W2 is indistinguishable from the covert stochastic process Q⊗nx0W2 ,αn,βn when
averaged over all choices of the common message W2. Finally, we identify a coding
scheme that achieves (4.18) and (4.19) such that (4.17) is satisfied.
3Note that the characterization of r1 in (4.18) is valid for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and not just λ∗, as
long as there exists a γ ⩾ 0 that satisfies (1− λ)D(P1∥P0) + λγD(P0∥P1) > (1− λ)D(Q1∥Q0) +
λγD(Q0∥Q1).
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Random code generation Let us define a set Dnϵ ≜ {x : |wt(x)n − λ∗| < ϵ}, where
wt (x) ≜ |ℓ ∈ J1, nK : xℓ = 1| is the weight of x. For j ∈ J1,M2K, we generate M2 code-
words x0j ∈ X n independently at random according to the distribution P nX defined
by
P nX (x) ≜
Λ⊗n (x)1{x ∈ Dnϵ }
PΛ⊗n(X ∈ Dnϵ )
. (4.20)
Generating {x0j}M2j=1 according to P nX ensures that every x0j is ϵ-letter typical w.r.t.
the distribution Λ. We label this set of M2 codewords as the innocent codebook C2.
For every W2 = j ∈ J1,M2K, we generate M1 codewords independently at random
according to the distribution Πx0j ,αn,βn and label this set of codewords as the covert
sub-codebook C1,j corresponding to the common message W2 = j. Alice encodes the
message pair (W1,W2) = (i, j), where i ∈ J1,M1K and j ∈ J1,M2K, to the code-










we show that the decoding error probability of the common message at Bob and
Willie averaged over all random codebooks C decays exponentially in the following
lemma.
Lemma 9. For any µ ∈ (0, 1) , ∃n0 ∈ N∗ such that for all n ⩾ n0, if


























⩽ exp (−ξ1n) , (4.25)
for an appropriate constant ξ1 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 9 follows the random coding argument outlined in [81, Section
7.3] and is omitted here. Note that ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z,
WZ|X(z|x) = VX|X(0|x)Q0(z) + VX|X(1|x)Q1(z). (4.26)
Consequently, we have
WZ|X(z|0) = Q0(z) + αn (Q1(z)−Q0(z)) , (4.27)
WZ|X(z|1) = Q1(z) + βn (Q0(z)−Q1(z)) . (4.28)
Since limn→∞ αn = limn→∞ βn = 0, the channels WZ|X and WZ|X are identical in the
limit of large blocklength. Using a similar argument, we can show that the channels
WY |X and WY |X are identical in the limit of large blocklength.
Next, defining QZ(z) ≜
∑















(1−λ∗) (Q0(z)+αn (Q1(z)−Q0(z))) log
(
Q0(z) + αn (Q1(z)−Q0(z))
QZ(z)
)
+ λ∗ (Q1(z) + βn (Q0(z)−Q1(z))) log
(































+O (αn) +O (βn) . (4.32)

























in Section 4.3 and the fact
that limn→∞ αn = limn→∞ βn = 0. Consequently, we assume both Bob and Willie










for an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1).
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Channel reliability analysis We now prove that the decoding error probability
of the covert message at Bob decays exponentially. For i ∈ J1,M1K, the following
events lead to a decoding error at Bob,
• codeword x0j is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates Ŵ1 = i,
• codeword xij is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates Ŵ1 = 0,
• codeword xij is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates Ŵ1 = i′ ∈J1,M1K, where i′ ̸= i.
The decoding error probability of the covert message at Bob averaged over all random
codebooks satisfies the following lemma.
Lemma 10. For any µ ∈ (0, 1) ,∃n0 ∈ N∗ such that for all n ⩾ n0, if








⩽ exp (−ξ2nαn) + exp (−ξ2nβn) , (4.36)
for an appropriate ξ2 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 10 is provided in Appendix 4.B.
Channel resolvability analysis We now show that the KL divergence between




over all choices of the common message and all random codebooks vanishes in the
limit of large blocklength.
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Lemma 11. For any ν > 0, ∃n0 ∈ N∗ such that for all n ⩾ n0, if










⩽exp (−ξ3nαn) + exp (−ξ3nβn) , (4.38)
for an appropriate ξ3 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 11 is provided in Appendix 4.C.

















































Defining ϵn ≜ exp (−ξ4nαn) + exp (−ξ4nβn) for an appropriate constant ξ4 > 0, we






















where x0W2 ∈ C∗2 is the codeword corresponding to the common message W2. We ex-
purgate half of the innocent codewords and their corresponding covert sub-codebooks
such that for every remaining W2 = j, we have
P
(1)
e,1,j ⩽ 8ϵn, (4.44)
P
(1)
e,2,j ⩽ 8ϵn, (4.45)
P
(2)








without affecting the asymptotic rate of the common message. Note that covert-
ness is not affected by expurgating whole covert sub-codebooks. Since limn→∞ ϵn =
0, (4.44), (4.45), and (4.46) imply limn→∞ P (1)e = limn→∞ P (2)e = 0.


































Following steps similar to [69, (249)-(254)], we bound the absolute value of the last
term in (4.48) for a large n and an appropriate ξ6 > 0 by∣∣∣∣∣∑
z
(





∣∣∣∣∣⩽ exp (−ξ6nαn) + exp (−ξ6nβn) .
(4.49)
Combining (4.47) to (4.49), we conclude that for a large n,
∣∣∣D(Q̂nj ∥Qnj )− D(Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn∥Q⊗nx0j ,0,0)∣∣∣ ⩽ exp (−ξ7nαn) + exp (−ξ7nβn) , (4.50)
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for an appropriate constant ξ7 > 0.
Asymptotic behavior We now establish the asymptotic scaling of logM1 for the
proposed covert communication scheme. Combining (4.15) and (4.50), for a fixed


















































− exp (−ξ7nαn)− exp (−ξ7nβn) . (4.52)







) = √2 (1− µ) (1− λ∗)D(P1∥P0) + λ∗γD(P0∥P1)√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1∥Q0) + λ∗γ2χ2 (Q0∥Q1)
. (4.53)
Ultimately, combining (4.37), (4.51), (4.52), and (4.53), we arrive at the condition
in (4.17).
Theorem 4. For the channel model described in Section 4.3, consider a sequence of
(M1,M2, n, ϵn, δn) codes with increasing block length n such that limn→∞ ϵn = 0 and
limn→∞ δn = 0. If the common message is transmitted using a codebook that achieves
the capacity of the channel to Willie, then for every j ∈ J1,M2K, there exists an








) ⩽ maxγ⩾0 √2 (1− λ∗)D(P1∥P0) + λ∗γD(P0∥P1)√(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1∥Q0) + λ∗γ2χ2 (Q0∥Q1) . (4.54)
For some γ∗ ⩾ 0 that maximizes the right hand side of (4.54) and for a subsequence
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of codes with increasing blocklength n ∈ N that achieves a covert throughput equal to








) ⩾ √2 (1− λ∗)D(Q1∥Q0) + λ∗γ∗D(Q0∥Q1)√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1∥Q0) + λ∗ (γ∗)2 χ2 (Q0∥Q1)
. (4.55)
Proof. Consider a capacity-achieving codebook C∗ for the channel between Alice and
Willie. For a fixed common message W2 = j, consider a sequence of covert commu-
nication schemes characterized by ϵn,j ≜ P
(
Ŵ1 ̸= W1|W2 = j
)





and logM1 takes the maximum value such that limn→∞ logM1 = ∞. Note that
limn→∞ ϵn,j = limn→∞ δn,j = 0 since limn→∞ ϵn = limn→∞ δn = 0. We denote the
innocent codeword corresponding to W2 = j by x0j = (x0j,1, x0j,2, . . . , x0j,n) ∈ C∗,
the innocent symbol at position ℓ by x0j,ℓ, and the information symbol at position
ℓ by xc0j,ℓ ≜ 1 − x0j,ℓ. For a fixed W2 = j, Alice transmits an n-length codeword
Xij = (Xij,1, Xij,2, . . . , Xij,n), i ∈ J1,M1K, and we denote the distribution of the






1{Xij,ℓ = x} . (4.56)
We define Πj,ℓ(xc0j,ℓ) = 1 − Πj,ℓ(x0j,ℓ) = µ
(n)
j,ℓ . We interpret µ
(n)
j,ℓ as the probability of
flipping innocent symbol x0j,ℓ to information symbol xc0j,ℓ at symbol position ℓ ∈ J1, nK.
Note that the innocent symbol x0j,ℓ depends on the choice of the common message
W2 = j and the symbol position ℓ. For W2 = j and every n ∈ N∗, we define a





The performance of the new code that satisfies (4.57) is identical to that of the original
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code since the channel is memoryless. Hence, without loss of generality, we only study
the sequence of codes that satisfies (4.57) for every n ∈ N∗. For conciseness, we define
the following terms.
P 0j,ℓ(y) ≜ WY |X(y|x0j,ℓ), P 1j,ℓ(y) ≜ WY |X(y|xc0j,ℓ), (4.58)
Q0j,ℓ(z) ≜ WZ|X(z|x0j,ℓ), Q1j,ℓ(z) ≜ WZ|X(z|xc0j,ℓ). (4.59)
Define Kj,ℓ(z) ≜ Q1j,ℓ(z) − Q0j,ℓ(z). Note that ∀z ∈ Z, Kj,ℓ(z) equals either Q1(z) −
Q0(z) or Q0(z)−Q1(z) depending on the choices of j and ℓ. Defining K(z) ≜ |Kj,ℓ(z)|,
we remove the dependency of K(z) on j and ℓ. We define the distribution of each





= Q0j,ℓ(z) + µ
(n)
j,ℓ Kj,ℓ(z). (4.61)








= −H(Z|W2 = j)−
∑
z

































Since δn,j vanishes in the limit of large blocklength and since KL divergence is non-












= 0, which implies that ∀z ∈ Z,
lim
n→∞





j,1K(z) = 0. (4.68)
However, K(z) is not exactly zero for all z ∈ Z, since Q1 ̸= Q0. Hence, we obtain
limn→∞ µ(n)j,1 = 0. Consequently, from (4.57), we conclude that limn→∞ µ
(n)
j,ℓ = 0 for
all ℓ ∈ J1, nK. Next, define
Ψ
(n)


















j (z) ≜ max
ℓ∈J1,nK ξ(n)j,ℓ (z). (4.71)
Since limn→∞ µ(n)j,ℓ = 0, we have limn→∞Ψ
(n)
j,ℓ (z) = limn→∞ ξ
(n)
j,ℓ (z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z

























Combining (4.74) and the fact that ξ(n)j (z) is non-negative by definition, we conclude
that limn→∞ ξ(n)j (z) = 0, ∀z ∈ Z. Continuing the analysis of δn,j from (4.66), we
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where (a) follows from the fact that log(1 + x) ⩾ x − x2
2
















j,ℓ = 0. Then, we define





































where nj,0 and nj,1 denote the number of 0’s and 1’s in x0j, respectively; ρ(n)j,0 and ρ
(n)
j,1
are the average flipping probabilities from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 0, respectively. Note
that limn→∞ ρ(n)j,0 = 0 and limn→∞ ρ
(n)





R+. If limn→∞ γ(n)j = 0 or ∞, only symbols in positions either with innocent symbol 0
or 1, respectively, are used to embed covert information. Else, the sequence {γ(n)j } is
bounded, and we can extract a convergent subsequence {γ(n)j }n∈N , where N ⊆ N∗ is
an infinite set, with limit γ†j . Henceforth, we only consider the subsequence of codes
with blocklength n ∈ N . Note that 1−λ(n)j =
nj,0
n





























































































































































where (a) follows from (4.82) and (4.83).
We pause the analysis of δn,j here and define constant composition sub-codebooks [82]
Fk ⊂ C∗ with type Pk in which k denotes the weight of any codeword of that type.
As there are (n + 1) different types for sequences {0, 1}n, there are at most (n+ 1)
such sub-codebooks. Let us recall that the codebook C∗ is a capacity-achieving code-
book for the channel between Alice and Willie; that is, the rate of the common
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− δ(n) with limn→∞ δ(n) = 0. Let us assume that
∀k ∈ J1, nK, log|Fk|
n








exp (n (R− δ)) (4.89)
= (n+ 1) exp (n (R− δ)) (4.90)
⩽ exp (n (R− δ′)) . (4.91)
We note that the assumption log|Fk|
n
⩽ R−δ for all k ∈ J1, nK results in a contradiction




> R− δ (4.92)
and Pk∗(1) = 1 − Pk∗(0) = k
∗
n
∈ (0, 1). Using [82, Corollary 6.4], we bound the rate

















− δ − 2υ. (4.94)
Using the unicity of the capacity-achieving input distribution, the concavity of mutual
information and (4.94), we conclude that the type Pk∗ is arbitrarily close to Λ since δ
and υ are arbitrary. Consequently, we replace λ(n)j with λ† ≜ λ∗ − ϵ for an arbitrarily
small ϵ ∈ R.
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We then bound logM1 using standard converse steps.
logM1 = H(W1|W2 = j) (4.95)
⩽ I(W1;Y|W2 = j) +Hb (ϵn,j) + ϵn,j logM1 (4.96)
⩽ I(W1X;Y|W2=j) +Hb (ϵn,j) + ϵn,j logM1 (4.97)
= I(X;Y|W2 = j) + I(W1;Y|W2 = j,X) +Hb (ϵn,j) + ϵn,j logM1 (4.98)
(a)









I(Xℓ;Yℓ|W2 = j)+Hb (ϵn,j)+ϵn,j logM1, (4.101)
where (a) follows from the fact that I(W1;Y|W2 = j,X) = 0, and (b) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy and the memoryless property of the channel
WY |X . Rearranging the terms in (4.101), we obtain
logM1 ⩽
∑n
ℓ=1 I(Xℓ;Yℓ|W2 = j) +Hb (ϵn,j)
1− ϵn,j
. (4.102)
Defining P̂j,ℓ as the distribution of symbol Yℓ of Y, we upper bound the mutual














































































j,0 = ∞. Consequently,
from (4.87), we conclude that limn→∞
n∈N
√
nδn,j = ∞. Combining (4.87), (4.108), and
the facts that limn→∞
n∈N
√
nδn,j = ∞ and limn→∞
n∈N













































(1− λ†)D(P1∥P0) + λ†γ†jD(P0∥P1)√






Following standard steps, we lower bound logM1 by
logM1 = H(W1|W2 = j) (4.111)
⩾ I(W1;Z|W2 = j) (4.112)
(a)
= H(Z|W2 = j)−H(Z|X,W1,W2 = j) (4.113)
(b)


























I(Xℓ;Zℓ|W2 = j)− δn,j, (4.117)
where (a) follows from the fact that X is a function of (W1,W2), (b) follows from the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and (c) follows from (4.60) and the fact that
KL divergence is non-negative. Continuing the analysis of logM1 by expanding the






























































where (a) follows from (4.66). For an arbitrary ν ∈ (0, 1), an n large enough, and for









(1− λ†)D(P1∥P0) + λ†γ†jD(P0∥P1)√






4We know that there exists at least one such code from Theorem 3.
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(1− λ†)D(P1∥P0) + λ†γ†jD(P0∥P1)
)
√








































Combining (4.121) and (4.125) and letting ϵ ↓ 0 in the definition of λ† and ν ↓ 0



















Note that the bounds (4.110) and (4.126) still depend on the choice of the common
message W2 = j through γ†j . To eliminate this dependency, we choose an optimal
γ∗ ⩾ 0 that maximizes the right hand side of (4.110) provided the following condition
is satisfied.
(1− λ∗)D(P1∥P0) + λ∗γ∗D(P0∥P1) ⩾ (1− λ∗)D(Q1∥Q0) + λ∗γ∗D(Q0∥Q1). (4.127)
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Consequently, replacing γ†j with γ∗ in (4.110) and (4.126), we obtain (4.54) and (4.55).
For the subsequence of codes with blocklength n ∈ N , where N ⊆ N∗ is an infinite








) = √2 (1− λ∗)D(P1∥P0) + λ∗γ∗D(P0∥P1)√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1∥Q0) + λ∗ (γ∗)2 χ2 (Q0∥Q1)
, (4.128)
for some γ∗ that achieves the maximum in (4.54). According to Theorem 4, for that




is lower bounded as in (4.55). The
combination of (4.55) and (4.128) imposes
(1− λ∗)D(P1∥P0) + λ∗γD(P0∥P1) ⩾ (1− λ∗)D(Q1∥Q0) + λ∗γD(Q0∥Q1), (4.129)
which characterizes the advantage that Bob should possess over Willie to facilitate







which depends on the choice of the common message W2 = j, the bounds on logM1
are independent of j.
Also, for any sequence {an}n∈N∗ and any infinite set N ⊆ N∗, we have lim infn→∞ an ⩽
lim infn→∞
n∈N
an and lim supn→∞ an ⩾ lim supn→∞n∈N an. Combining this fact with Theo-
rem 3 and Theorem 4, we conclude that the optimal covert embedding throughput
when the common message is transmitted at a rate close to the capacity of the channel
to Willie, is given by
√
2
(1− λ∗)D(P1∥P0) + λ∗γ∗D(P0∥P1)√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1∥Q0) + λ∗ (γ∗)2 χ2 (Q0∥Q1)
, (4.130)
where γ∗ ⩾ 0 is the largest number that satisfies (4.129).
In our main result, λ∗ is related to the unique capacity-achieving input distribution
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for the channel to Willie. In a sense, λ∗ denotes the fraction of symbol positions in
which symbol 1 serves as the innocent symbol; subsequently, (1 − λ∗) denotes the
fraction of symbol positions in which symbol 0 is the innocent symbol. Note that
in (4.17), all terms except γ are fixed by the channel. γ is a parameter that can be
tuned at the transmitter, and it corresponds to the ratio of the probability of flipping
1 to 0 to the probability of flipping 0 to 1. Setting γ to 0 or ∞ results in the extreme
case of using only one of the symbols to embed information.
Remark 1. As a special case, let us assume that the channel to Willie is degraded
w.r.t. the channel to Bob. This assumption guarantees that (4.129) is satisfied as
degradedness implies D(P1∥P0) > D(Q1∥Q0) and D(P0∥P1) > D(Q0∥Q1). Hence,
in this case, covert information can be embedded on top of innocent transmissions.
However, the degraded broadcast channel assumption is not a necessary condition
to facilitate keyless covert communication in our case. As an example, let us con-




with D(P1∥P0) < D(Q1∥Q0) and
D(P0∥P1) > D(Q0∥Q1). Here, the channel WZ|X is not degraded w.r.t. the channel
WY |X . Since all KL divergence terms and λ∗ in (4.129) are determined by the channel,
the only degree of freedom is γ. By choosing a γ that satisfies (4.129), covert infor-
mation can be transmitted by embedding it on top of innocent transmissions without
using a secret key despite the channel to Willie not being degraded w.r.t. the channel
to Bob.
Remark 2. For symmetric channels with two inputs, note that D(P1∥P0) = D(P0∥P1),












since γ∗ = 1 and λ∗ = 1
2
. For the subsequece of codes that achieves the right hand










Note that the covert throughput in (4.131) matches that of the point-to-point chan-
nel [27]. As a special case, we consider a broadcast setup for BSCs with pB and pW as
the crossover probabilities for the channels from Alice to Bob and Willie, respectively.
Assuming pB ⩽ 12 and pW ⩽
1
2
without loss of generality, we obtain












χ2 (Q1∥Q0) = χ2 (Q0∥Q1) =
(1− 2pW )2
pW (1− pW )
. (4.135)

















is a strictly decreasing function for x ∈ [0, 1
2
], the condition
in (4.136) translates to pB ⩽ pW . Hence, to embed covert information over a binary
symmetric broadcast channel without using a secret key, the crossover probability of
the channel to Bob cannot be greater than the crossover probability of the channel to
Willie.
4.6 Conclusion
We conclude this chapter by briefly discussing an extension of our results to non-
binary input alphabets. Consider an input alphabet X ≜ {u}K−1u=0 , where K > 2.
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Note that, in our scenario, there is no notion of a fixed innocent symbol. We confirm
that our results extend to non-binary input alphabets, and the steps required to arrive
at our results are similar to those for the binary case discussed in this work. We denote
the unique capacity-achieving input distribution for the channel to Willie by Λ, where




u = 1. We define two vectors γ ≜ {γu}u∈J0,K−1K ∈ RK+
and β ≜ {βuv}(u,v)∈J0,K−1K2 ∈ [0, 1]K2 such that βuu = 0, and ∑K−1v=0 βuv = 1 for all
u ∈ J0, K − 1K. Then, following our proof techniques, one can show that we can
achieve, for an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1),

































4.A Proof of Lemma 8




i=1Qxi,αn,βn . We now


























For k ∈ N∗ and two distributions P and Q defined on the same alphabet Z, we










































χ4 (Q0∥Q1) . (4.142)
For n large enough, using [27, Lemma 1], we lower bound the two KL divergence




















































































Ultimately, combining (4.140), (4.145), and (4.146), we obtain (4.15).
4.B Proof of Lemma 10
We denote the covert transmission status of Alice by T ≜ 1− 1{W1 = 0} and Bob’s
estimate of T by T̂ . For j ∈ J1,M2K and x0j ∈ C2, define
Anγj ≜
{
(x,y) ∈ X n × Yn : log





where γj > 0 will be determined later. The decoder at Bob operates as follows
• if ∃ unique i such that (xij,y) ∈ Anγj , output Ŵ1 = i,
• else if ̸ ∃ i such that (xij,y) ∈ Anγj , output Ŵ1 = 0,
• else, declare a decoding error.


























∣∣∣T̂ = t = 1, Ŵ2 = W2 = j)) . (4.149)
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The decoding error probability of the covert message averaged over all choices of the











= E1 + E2. (4.150)




















∣∣∣t = 0, Ŵ2 = W2 = j)) . (4.151)























































where (a) follows from the fact that the probability of intersection of several events





















































































































































Xi;Yi|X i = x0j,i
)
for an arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1). Expanding
I
(































































1{x0j,i = 1} ,
(4.164)
where (a) follows from combining (4.141), (4.142), (4.143), and (4.144), in the proof





and aggregating the n mutual information





Xi;Yi|X i = x0j,i
)
















⩽ exp (−ζ1nαn)+exp (−ζ1nβn) , (4.166)
for an appropriate ζ1 > 0, where (a) follows from using Bernstein’s inequality as in [69,
Appendix D]. Then, combining (4.150), (4.151), (4.153), (4.154), (4.158), (4.159), (4.161),
and (4.166), we infer that (4.36) is satisfied for a large n and an appropriate constant
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ξ2 > 0 if logM1 satisfies










for every j ∈ J1,M2K. Note that x0j is generated according to P nX defined in (4.20).
Hence, λj is arbitrarily close to λ∗. Combining this with the fact that δ is arbi-
trary, (4.36) is true if logM1 satisfies (4.35).
4.C Proof of Lemma 11
For W2 = j and x0j ∈ C2, define the set
Bnτj ≜
{






where τj > 0 will be determined later. For a fixed j ∈ J1,M2K and i ∈ J1,M1K,
the expectation over all random codewords {Xkj}k∈J1,M1K\{i} is denoted by E∼i. We
bound the KL divergence between Q̂nW2 and Q
⊗n
X0W2 ,αn,βn
averaged over all choices of



















































































































































































(xij, z) ̸∈ Bnτj
}
, (4.176)




Z|X (z|xkj)Πx0j ,αn,βn (xkj) = Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn (z).









































and using steps similar to those used to obtain (4.165)





Xi;Zi|X i = x0j,i
)














Xi;Zi|X i = x0j,i
)
for an arbitrary δ > 0, we bound the







for an appropriate ζ2 > 0. Consequently, combining (4.177) and (4.179) and ensuring5
logM1 satisfies (4.37) for an arbitrary ν ∈ (0, 1) and a large n, we conclude that there
exists a constant ξ3 > 0 such that (4.38) is satisfied.
5Similar to Appendix 4.B, we remove the dependency of logM1 on j via λj in τj using the fact




COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER A PHYSICALLY DEGRADED
RELAY CHANNEL WITH NON-COLLUDING WARDENS
5.1 Summary
In this chapter, we analyze a physically degraded relay channel, in which the trans-
mitter sends a covert message to the legitimate receiver with the help of a relay.
Two wardens, who do not collude with each other, monitor communication from the
transmitter and the relay, respectively, through two Discrete Memoryless Channels
(DMCs) to detect the transmission of a covert message. The objective of the trans-
mitter is to deliver the covert message successfully to the receiver without exceeding
the covertness threshold of either wardens. We identify the optimal asymptotic scal-
ing of the message and key bits and the dependence of the number of covert bits on
the two covert thresholds.
5.2 Introduction
Since any large communication network is fundamentally made up of multiple-access,
broadcast, and relay channels, the analysis of covert communication over such models
is of interest, especially when attempts to build entire covert networks on the hori-
zon. In previous chapters, we characterized the information-theoretic limits of covert
communication over multiple-access and broadcast channels [69, 80]. Following up,
in this chapter, we show that the achievability and converse techniques developed
in [27, 33, 69, 80] extend to physically degraded relay channels as well. We char-
acterize the exact number of covert bits that can be transmitted over a physically
























Figure 5.1: Model of covert communication over a physically degraded relay channel
with two non-colluding wardens.
monitored by two non-colluding wardens. The presence of a second warden at the
relay who monitors his communication is justified by the fact that a user who aids
covert communication would want to keep his assistance covert as well.
A relay channel in which the relay communicates its own message covertly while
hiding it from the transmitter, who also serves as the warden, is studied in [83]. In
this case, the relay receives a sequence from the transmitter, adds his own covert
message and relays the transmission to the receiver. Note that our channel model
is significantly different, since in our case, the relay does not have its own covert
message to send to the receiver. Moreover, [83] simplifies covertness analysis by using
i.i.d. Gaussian codebooks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.3 introduces the channel
model, and Section 5.4 presents our main result. The proofs are relegated to the
appendix. This chapter is based on the results obtained in [84].
5.3 Channel Model





that is physically degraded.
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Then, for all x1, x2, y2, y3, WY2Y3|X1X2 decomposes as [85]
WY2Y3|X1X2(y2, y3|x1, x2) = WY2|X1X2(y2|x1, x2)WY3|Y2X2(y3|y2, x2). (5.1)
As mentioned earlier, two wardens monitor the communication to detect covert trans-










. We assume binary input alphabets for both the
transmitter and the relay, that is, X1 = X2 = X ≜ {0, 1}. We fix 0 as the innocent
symbol, that is, the channel input when no communication occurs. We also assume
finite output alphabets. For a, b ∈ {0, 1}, we denote the output distributions at the
relay and at Bob, the receiver, respectively by
P ab(y2) ≜ WY2|X1X2(y2|a, b), (5.2)
Pab(y3) ≜ WY3|X1X2(y3|a, b), (5.3)
for y2 ∈ Y2 and y3 ∈ Y3. On a related note, for a ∈ {0, 1}, we define the output
distributions at the two wardens, respectively, by
Qa(z1) ≜ WZ1|X1(z1|a), (5.4)
Qa(z2) ≜ WZ2|X2(z2|a), (5.5)
for z1 ∈ Z1 and z2 ∈ Z2. For reasons discussed in [27] and previous chapters, we
assume that Pab ≪ P00 and P ab ≪ P 00 for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}. We also assume that
Q1 ≪ Q0, Q1 ≪ Q0, Q1 ̸= Q0, and Q1 ̸= Q0 as in [27].
Alice wants to communicate a covert message W uniformly distributed in J1,MK
to Bob with the help of a relay and a secret key that is uniformly distributed in
J1, KK. Alice maps the covert message and the key to a transmission sequence X1.
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The relay generates the current symbol based on his past observations; that is, X2,i
is a function of the observed sequence (Y2,1, . . . , Y2,i−1) and the shared key S. Upon
observing the entire output sequence Y3, Bob uses Y3 and the shared key to estimate





. Wardens 1 and 2 observe sequences Z1 and Z2, respectively. We
denote the distributions induced at the two wardens when communication takes place
by Q̂n1 and Q̂n2 , respectively. Furthermore, we measure covertness at the wardens











communication scheme used by Alice ensures that both the KL divergence terms
above are below the respective covert thresholds, then any statistical test used by the
wardens is futile in detecting the presence of a covert message. The objective of Alice
is to transmit such that, for δ1, δ2 > 0,
lim
n→∞



















We refer to δ1 and δ2 in (5.7) and (5.8) as the covertness thresholds of wardens 1 and
2, respectively. In a sense, covertness thresholds can be understood as tolerances of
the wardens. Unlike previous chapters, in this chapter, we do not require that the
covertness measure to vanish in the limit of large blocklength. In order to understand
how the covert thresholds affect the number of reliable and covert bits that can be
transmitted with the help of a relay, we characterize the exact scaling of logM and
logK with n in terms of δ1, δ2 > 0, such that (5.6), (5.7), and (5.8) are all satisfied.
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5.4 Main result
In this section, we present our main result in Theorem 5 and provide an achievability















For any γ ⩾ 0 and β ∈ [0, 1], we define





























(1− β)P 01 + βP 11∥P 00
)
, (5.12)
ζ2 (γ, β) ≜ D(P10∥P00) + γ(1− β)D(P01∥P00) + γβD(P11∥P00). (5.13)
We also define
κ1 (γ, β) ≜ min (ζ1 (γ, β) , ζ2 (γ, β)) , (5.14)
κ2 (γ, β) ≜ max
(





to represent our results in a concise manner. Our main result is the following.
Theorem 5. For the degraded channel model described in Section 5.3, let M∗(n, ϵ) be
the largest possible value of M such that an n-length channel code can be constructed











2Γ (γ, β)κ1 (γ, β) . (5.16)
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2Γ (γ∗, β∗)[κ2 (γ








2Γ (γ∗, β∗)[κ2 (γ
∗, β∗)−κ1 (γ∗, β∗)]+, (5.18)
for some (γ∗, β∗) pair that achieves the limit in (5.16).
Note that both Γ(γ, β)κ1(γ, β) and Γ(γ, β)κ2(γ, β) are bounded for all γ ⩾ 0 and
β ∈ [0, 1]. If there exist multiple (γ∗, β∗) pairs, we choose the pair that minimizes
the lower bound in (5.18), that is, we choose the pair that needs the least amount of
secret key to be shared.

























which matches the covert throughput achieved when the relay is not used to forward
any covert information [27], that is, when information only flows directly from Alice
to Bob.
In the two subsections that follow, we describe a covert communication scheme
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that achieves the optimal covert throughput in (5.16) and a converse that proves that
the achievable scheme discussed is asymptotically optimal.
5.4.1 Proof of achievability for Theorem 5
In our communication scheme, we use a block-Markovian encoding scheme at Alice
and the relay encoder, and a sliding-window decoding scheme at Bob. We follow
the decode-and-forward scheme detailed in [86] with slight modifications to ensure
covertness at the wardens. For B ∈ N∗, divide the message m ∈ J1,MK into B
equal-sized messages mB1 each of length logM ′, where logM ′ = logMB . Also, di-
vide the key k ∈ J1, KK into B + 1 parts: kB1 , each of length logK ′, and another
part k̂. We specify logK ′ and the length of k̂ later. Alice randomly chooses a pair
(m0, k0) ∈ J1,M ′K × J1, K ′K and reveals it to Bob and the relay. Note that, unlike
block-Markovian encoding in traditional problems [85, 86], m0 cannot be fixed in
advance, because the warden can detect a fixed codeword with ease. To this end, we
employ the key k̂ to reveal the message-key pair (m0, k0) to the relay and Bob. Note
that k̂ is of length logM ′ + logK ′. Consequently, we have
logK = (B + 1) logK ′ + logM ′. (5.22)





· Γ(γ, β), (5.23)
and fix γ ⩾ 0 and β ∈ [0, 1] such that αn ∈ (0, 1). For a large n, define the input
distribution ΠX2 by
ΠX2(1) = 1− ΠX2(0) = γαn, (5.24)
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and the conditional distribution ΠX1|X2 by
ΠX1|X2(1|0) = 1− ΠX1|X2(0|0) = αn, (5.25)
ΠX1|X2(1|1) = 1− ΠX1|X2(0|1) = β. (5.26)
Note that while αn is a function of n, β ∈ [0, 1] is a constant. Furthermore, defining
ρn ≜ 1 + γβ − γαn and combining (5.24), (5.25), and (5.26), we have
ΠX1(1) = ρnαn. (5.27)
Since limn→∞ αn = 0, we have limn→∞ ρn = 1 + γβ.
Next, we generate a separate codebook Cb for each block b ∈ J1, B + 1K. We
define N ≜ n
B+1
. For block b, first generate M ′K ′ codewords x2b,k(m) each of length
N , where m ∈ J1,M ′K and k ∈ J1, K ′K, according to the distribution Π⊗NX2 . Then, for
each x2b,s(w), generate M ′K ′ codewords x1b,(k,k′)(m,m′) of length N , where m,m′ ∈J1,M ′K and k, k′ ∈ J1, K ′K, conditionally independently according to the distribution
Π⊗NX1|X2(·|x2b,k(m)). In transmission block b, Bob and the relay observe the N -length
sequences y2b and y3b, respectively. Similarly, the wardens observe the N -length
sequences z1b and z2b, respectively, in block b. We fix mB+1 = kB+1 = 1 and reveal this




























we define the sets
ANη ≜ ANη1 ∩ A
N
η21




∩ ANη22 , (5.32)
We specify the exact values of η1, η21, and η22 later.
Encoding and decoding
• In block b, Alice encodes the message pair (mb−1,mb) ∈ J1,M ′K2 and the key
pair (kb−1, kb) ∈ J1, K ′K2 into the codeword x1b,(kb−1,kb)(mb−1,mb).
• In transmission block b, the relay observes y2b and finds an estimate m̃b such that(
x1b,(kb−1,kb) (m̃b−1, m̃b) ,x2b,kb−1 (m̃b−1) ,y2b
)
∈ ANη1 , where m̃b−1 is the relay’s
estimate of mb−1 in the previous block b− 1.
• If multiple m̃b are found, the relay chooses one among them at random; if none
are found, the relay sets m̃b = 1.
• The relay encodes its estimate m̃b into codeword x2(b+1),kb(m̃b) and transmits it
in transmission block b+ 1.
• Bob uses a block-sliding window decoder of length 2n spanning two blocks at
any point of time.
• Bob observes y3(b−1) and y3b during blocks b−1 and b, respectively, and finds an
estimate m̂b−1 such that
(







∈ ANη22 , where m̂b−2 is Bob’s estimate in the pre-
vious block.
• If multiple m̂b−1 are found, Bob chooses one among them at random; if none
are found, Bob sets m̂b−1 = 1.
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Reliability Analysis The decoding error probability Pe averaged over all random
codebooks satisfies the following lemma.
Lemma 12. For an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1), a large N , and
logM = (1− µ)n B
B + 1
αnκ1 (γ, β) , (5.33)
the probability of decoding error averaged over all random codebooks C is
EC (Pe) ⩽ exp (−cNαn) , (5.34)
for an appropriate constant c > 0.
Note that the fraction B
B+1
approximates 1 as B becomes large. The proof of
Lemma 12 is provided in Appendix 5.A.
Resolvability analysis Following our approach [27] of first defining a covert pro-
cess that is indistinguishable from the innocent distribution and then designing a
communication scheme that induces a distribution close to the covert process, we


























































































It then remains to show that the induced distributions at the two non-colluding
wardens are indistinguishable from the respective covert processes. The gist of our
approach is to use channel resolvability techniques to ensure that the codebook Cb for
each transmission block has sufficiently enough codewords to confuse both wardens,
while simultaneously ensuring reliable decoding at Bob. In the following lemma, we
show that the KL divergence between the induced distribution and the respective
covert process at each warden is small.
Lemma 13. For an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1), a large N , and
logM + logK = (1 + µ)nαnκ2 (γ, β) , (5.46)
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the KL divergence between the induced distribution and the respective covert processes


















⩽ exp (−cnαn) , (5.48)
for an appropriate constant c > 0.
The proof of Lemma 13 is provided in Appendix 5.B.
Identification of a specific code Let us now consider the probability that for a
particular coding scheme, the error probability and KL divergences at both wardens
are simultaneously less than six times their respective expected values.
P
(


































































































where (a) follows from Markov’s inequality. From (5.51), we conclude that there must
exist at least one coding scheme such that, for a large n and appropriate constants
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c1, c2, c3 > 0,






















































































































































































⩽ δ2, our communication
scheme satisfies the covertness constraints in (5.7) and (5.8).
Asymptotic behavior Let us now characterize the asymptotic scaling of logM
for the covert communication scheme that we just discussed. We normalize (5.33) by
√

















Γ (γ, β)κ1 (γ, β) (5.63)
= (1− ξ1)
√
2Γ (γ, β)κ1 (γ, β) , (5.64)
for an appropriate ξ1 ∈ (0, 1). Normalizing (5.46) by
√












κ2 (γ, β) (5.65)
= (1 + ξ2)
√
2Γ (γ, β)κ2 (γ, β) (5.66)
(5.67)
where ξ2 > 0, is an appropriate constant.
5.4.2 Proof of converse for Theorem 5
Consider a covert communication scheme for a physically degraded relay channel
that satisfies (5.6), (5.7), and (5.8). Let W be the covert message and S be the secret
key. Alice and the relay transmit n-length sequences X1 = (X11, X12, . . . , X1n) and
X2 = (X21, X22, . . . , X2n), respectively. For i ∈ J1, nK, define the joint distribution of
the symbol pair (X1i, X2i) as ΠX1iX2i . We define two random variables X̃1 and X̃2
138







For a, b ∈ {0, 1}, define µ(n)ab ≜ ΠX̃1X̃2(a, b). We denote the corresponding marginal
distributions of X̃1 and X̃2 by ΠX̃1 and ΠX̃2 , respectively. Let P̂Y2i and P̂Y3i be the
distributions of outputs Y2 and Y3, respectively, at bit position i ∈ J1, nK. We also









respectively. Using standard techniques, we upper bound logM by
logM = H(W ) (5.71)
(a)







































I(X1iX2i;Y3i) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM, (5.77)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the fact that Y3i is indepen-
dent of (W,Yi−13 ) conditioned on (X1i, X2i). Defining a random variable Q uniformly
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+Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM (5.78)
= nI(X1QX2Q;Y3Q|Q) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM (5.79)
= n (H(Y3Q|Q)−H(Y3Q|X1QX2QQ)) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM (5.80)
⩽ n (H(Y3Q)−H(Y3Q|X1QX2Q)) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM (5.81)
= nI(X1QX2Q;Y3Q) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM. (5.82)
































10 D(P10∥P00) + µ
(n)







⩽ µ(n)10 D(P10∥P00) + µ
(n)
01 D(P01∥P00) + µ
(n)
11 D(P11∥P00). (5.86)






10 D(P10∥P00) + µ
(n)








Next, we upper bound logM alternatively by
logM = H(W ) (5.88)
= I(W ;Y2Y3) +H(W |Y2Y3) (5.89)
⩽ I(W ;Y2Y3) +H(W |Y3) (5.90)





























































I(X1i;Y2i|X2i) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM (5.98)
= nI(X1Q;Y2Q|X2QQ) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM (5.99)
= n (H(Y2Q|X2QQ)−H(Y2Q|X1QX2QQ)) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM (5.100)
⩽ n (H(Y2Q|X2Q)−H(Y2Q|X1QX2Q)) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM (5.101)
= nI(X1Q;Y2Q|X2Q) +Hb (ϵn) + ϵn logM, (5.102)
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where (a) follows from the fact that X2i is a function of Yi−12,1 , (b) follows from the




conditioned on (X1i, X2i), and
(c) follows from the fact that X1 − (X2, Y2) − Y3 forms a Markov chain because the















































































































































Let Q̂n1 and Q̂n2 be the distributions of observations Z1 and Z2, respectively, at
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ΠX̃1(x1)WZ1|X1(z1|x1). From (5.7), we have










































(Q1(z1)−Q0(z1)) = 0. (5.116)











































= 0. Consequently, using





















































































































































where (a) follows from the inequality log(1 + x) ⩾ x− x2
2
























































Using (5.7), (5.8), (5.131) and (5.134), we obtain








































. Note that the last KL divergence







(1− βn)P 01 + βnP 11∥P 00
)
. (5.137)
Combining (5.87) and (5.107), we have
logM ⩽ nµ
(n)










10 ≤ (1 + η)
√
2Γ(γn, βn). (5.139)
Combining (5.138) and (5.139), and letting η ↓ 0 proves the converse part of (5.16).
Next, we lower bound logMK. Note that, if a sequence of codes achieves the






2Γ(γ∗, β∗) as n → ∞, for some (γ∗, β∗) that achieves the limit on the
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right-hand side of (5.16). For any code in this subsequence, we have





































Normalizing (5.142) and (5.143) by
√
n and applying the limits, we have (for the








∗, β∗) . (5.144)
Combining (5.16) and (5.144) proves that logK must satisfy (5.18).
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APPENDIX
5.A Proof of Lemma 12
The decoding error probability averaged over all random codebooks is
























where Pe,b ≜ P(Error in block b|No errors in all previous blocks). Splitting Pe,b be-
tween the error probabilities at the relay and Bob using the union bound, we get
EC (Pe,b) = EC (P(Error in block b|No errors in previous blocks)) (5.149)
⩽ EC (P(Error in block b at the relay|No errors in previous blocks))






































′) ≜ E3(b−1),(k,k′)(m,m′) ∩ E3b,k(m). (5.155)



























































































where (a) follows from the fact that there is no error in m since P (1)e,b is the error
probability in block b at the relay conditioned on no errors in all previous blocks, and
(b) follows from the union bound. Denoting (kb−2, kb−1, kb) by (i, j, k) and defining
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where (a) follows from the fact that there are no errors in m since P (2)e,b is the error
probability in block b at Bob conditioned on no errors in all previous blocks. Error
in m′′, if any, will be part of the error analysis of P (2)e,b+1. Combining (5.151), (5.159),
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and (5.163), we obtain













For an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1), we define
η1 ≜ (1− µ)NI(X1;Y2|X2), (5.165)
η21 ≜ (1− µ)NI(X1;Y3|X2), (5.166)
η22 ≜ (1− µ)NI(X2;Y3). (5.167)
From the definition of η2, we have
η2 = (1− µ)NI(X1X2;Y3). (5.168)
Expanding the mutual information term in (5.165), we obtain
I(X1;Y2|X2) = (1− γαn) I(X1;Y2|X2 = 0) + γαnI(X1;Y2|X2 = 1). (5.169)
We expand the two mutual information terms on the right hand side of (5.169) as
follows.
























Note that we can write WY2|X2(y2|0) = P 00(y2) + αn
(
P 10(y2)− P 00(y2)
)
. Then, we


































where (a) follows from the Taylor series expansion of the log term. Moreover, the last







(1− β)P 01 + βP 11∥P 00
)
. (5.175)
























Next, we expand the mutual information term in (5.168) as








L(y3) ≜ γβ (P11(y3)− P01(y3)) + γ (P01(y3)− P00(y3))
+ (1− γαn) (P10(y3)− P00(y3)) . (5.178)
Using (5.178), we write
PY3(y3) = P00(y3) + αnL(y3). (5.179)


































L(y3) = 0. Combining (5.177) and (5.182), we have






Using (5.176) and (5.183), we rewrite (5.165) and (5.168) as










































c) ⩽ exp (−a1nαn) , (5.186)
for an appropriate constant a1 > 0. For a large n, if we choose M ′ such that
















(1− β)P 01 + βP 11∥P 00
)
, (5.187)
logM ′ < (1− µ)Nαn (D(P10∥P00) + γ(1− β)D(P01∥P00) + γβD(P11∥P00)) , (5.188)






⩽ exp (−a3nαn) , (5.190)
for appropriate constants a2, a3 > 0.


















where τ1 and τ2 will be defined later. Let the sequence z1 be a concatenation of












































Z2|X2 (z22|x22,k1(m1)) . . .








Q̂N2,b (z2b) , (5.196)










First, we analyze the KL divergence between the induced distribution Q̂n1 at the
first warden and the corresponding covert process Q⊗nαn . For the message-key pair(
mB0 ,kB0
)







(uB0 ,sB0 )∈J1,M ′KB+1×J1,K′KB+1\(mB0 ,kB0 ) by
E∼(mB0 ,kB0 ). The KL divergence between Q̂
n



















































(M ′K ′)B+1Q⊗nαn (z1)
 .
(5.198)
Define µ1 ≜ minz1∈Z1 Q0(z1) and a set Sb′ ⊂ J0, BK such that |Sb′| = b′, where
b′ ∈ J1, BK. For each set Sb′ , we define another set Tb′ ≜ {i+ 1 : i ∈ Sb′}. Now, we
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For an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1), let us define
τ1 ≜ (1 + µ)NI(X1;Z1). (5.203)
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Expanding I(X1;Z1), we obtain





Rewriting (5.203) using (5.204), we have









c) ⩽ exp (−a4nαn) , (5.206)
for an appropriate constant a4 > 0. Then, if we choose M ′ and K ′ such that, for a
large N ,
logM ′ + logK ′ > (1 + µ)NρnαnD(Q1∥Q0), (5.207)









⩽ exp (−a5nαn) , (5.208)
for an appropriate constant a5 > 0.
Next, we analyze the KL divergence between the induced distribution Q̂n2 at the
second warden and the covert process Q⊗nαn . Let us denote (mb−1, kb−1) by (i, j).
For the message-key pair (i, j) ∈ J1,M ′K × J1, K ′K, we denote the expectation over
all random codewords {X2b,k(ℓ)}(ℓ,k)∈J1,M ′K×J1,K′K\(i,j) by E∼(i,j). We bound the KL
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divergence between Q̂n2 and Q
⊗n



















































































































(x2b,j(i), z2b) ̸∈ BNτ2
}
. (5.213)






















For an arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1), define
τ2 ≜ (1 + µ)NI(X2;Z2). (5.215)
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Rewriting (5.215) using (5.216), we have













c) ⩽ exp (−a6nαn) , (5.218)
for an appropriate constant a6 > 0. Then, if we choose M ′ and K ′ such that, for a
large n,














⩽ exp (−a7nαn) , (5.220)





In this chapter, we consider a scenario in which Alice asynchronously communicates
with Bob over a DMC while escaping detection from an adversary who observes
their communication through another DMC. Specifically, Alice transmits codewords
of length n and chooses the transmission epoch T uniformly at random among N
available time epochs, where N ≫ n. This deliberate symbol level-asynchronism
forces the adversary to monitor a window of size N ′ much larger than the codeword
length n and results in an increased covert throughput compared to the scenario
without asynchronism. Our result generalizes a previous work in which asynchronism
was introduced at the codeword level, that is, having Alice choose a transmission
window among non-overlapping windows of length n.
6.2 Introduction
Many information-theoretic models implicitly assume that all terminals exactly know
when communication happens. However, if communication is intermittent, which is
likely the case for covert communication, users may not be synchronized [87]. The
lack of synchronization turns out to be beneficial for covertness [43, 88] as it forces
the adversary to look for transmitted messages over a longer time interval, even if
the actual transmission happens only in a fraction of that interval. In addition, the
improvement in covert throughput comes for free if the legitimate receiver does not
require knowledge of the actual transmission time to decode correctly.
This scenario is closely related to [43, 88], in which the effect of timing uncertainty
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on covert throughput over AWGN channels is analyzed. Specifically, [43] considers a
scenario in which the transmitter randomly chooses a transmission window of length
n out of T (n) contiguous and disjoint ones, thus forcing the adversary to monitor a
window of nT (n) symbols. The additional burden on the adversary leads to an im-
proved covert throughput of O (min {
√
n logT (n), n}). In this paper, we extend this





a transmission window of size n, where log θn ∈ o (n) and log θn > 0, provided the size










by embedding a transmission window of size n in a monitoring





instead of ω (n2) in [43]. The main conceptual difference
between our scenario and the one analyzed in [43] is that the offset between potential
transmission windows is reduced to one symbol instead of n symbols; that is, instead
of choosing from T (n) disjoint transmission windows, the transmitter chooses from
N consecutive time epochs to initiate transmission. In other words, we show that
symbol-level asynchronism is more beneficial than codeword-level asynchronism. Our
technical approach is also completely different and exploits ideas developed in [27,
89] together with Bernstein’s inequality. Bash et al. also extended their result to
symbol-level asynchronism later in [88]. The result in this chapter is based on the
results in [90].
6.3 Asynchronous Covert Communication
Before we detail the channel model, we briefly introduce the auxiliary notation used
exclusively in this chapter. Sequences of length N ′ ≜ N+n−1 are written in boldface
and sequences of length n are written in boldface with a line over it. For instance,
y denotes a sequence of length N ′ while y denotes a sequence of length n. Also,
the n-length sequence (yt, yt+1, yt+2, . . . , yt+n−1) is denoted by yt+n−1t . Note that N






















. . . , x0,X, x0, . . .s
X
Transmit at time T    1,N 
DECODER
DETECTOR
Figure 6.1: Model of asynchronous covert communication. Alice encodes message W
to codeword X and transmits at time T if the switch s = 1. Bob forms an estimate
Ŵ of W from Y. The warden performs a hypothesis test upon observing Z to detect
if the users communicate (H1) or not (H0).
in, whereas n denotes the length of the covert transmission sequence.
In this chapter, we consider the asynchronous model of covert communication
illustrated in Fig.6.1. Let x0 be the innocent symbol corresponding to the channel
input when no communication takes place and x0 be the corresponding N ′ length
sequence. We assume the existence of an information symbol x1 ∈ X such that
x1 ̸= x0, to encode the input message. Alice encodes a message W = i, uniformly
distributed in J1,MK, into a codeword Xi. We denote the symbols of Xi by X i,j,
j ∈ J1, nK.
Alice determines whether to transmit or not at the beginning of every block and
fixes the state of a switch s ∈ {0, 1} accordingly without any prior distribution. Alice
holds the state of this switch constant throughout transmission of that block and does
not disclose the state of the switch to Bob or the warden. If s = 1, the codeword Xi
is embedded in a longer sequence of x0’s by randomly choosing its start time T , i.e.,
X =
(
x0, . . . , x0,Xi, x0, . . . , x0
)
, as shown in Fig.6.2. This sequence X is sent over a
DMC
(
X ,WY |X ,Y
)
to Bob, the legitimate receiver. We assume that Alice chooses





. Else if s = 0, Alice transmits the innocent
sequence X = x0. We assume that all terminals possess complete knowledge of the
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. . .xi,1 xi,2 xi,3 . . . xi,n 1 xi,nx0 x0 x0
1 N Nt + n   1t + 1t2




Figure 6.2: Temporal representation of the channel input. Codeword xi is transmitted
starting at time t. Note that t can take any value from 1 to N .
coding scheme used. To be concise, for k ∈ {0, 1}, we define
Pk(y) ≜ WY |X(y|xk), (6.1)
Qk(z) ≜ WZ|X(z|xk). (6.2)
We assume that Q1 ≪ Q0 and Q1 ̸= Q0. Without this assumption, covert communi-
cation is either impossible or straightforward to achieve, which follows from reasons
similar to those discussed in Chapter 3.
Bob estimates the switch state ŝ and only attempts to decode the transmitted










Ŵ ̸= W |Ŝ = 1, s = 1
)
. (6.3)
With a slight abuse of terminology, we call Pe the average probability of error. Define
the output distributions at Bob and the warden, respectively, when communication









































































this KL divergence is negligible translates to the warden’s hypothesis tests on the
observation Z being futile. Our ultimate aim is to establish the scalings of logM and
N ′ with n for which there exist covert communication schemes such that
lim
n→∞
































according to [89] gives a rather loose upper
bound and does not reveal the advantages of introducing asynchronism at the symbol










6.4 Covert Communication Process
As we have grown accustomed to, by now, in this chapter, we define a covert process
that the induced distribution will attempt to simulate. We make certain modifications
to suit our techniques to the asynchrounous setting. For n ∈ N∗, let αn ∈ (0, 1).
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Define the input distribution ΠX on {x0, x1} by
ΠX(x1) = 1− ΠX(x0) ≜ αn. (6.11)
We define the corresponding output distributions at Bob and the warden by
Pαn(y) ≜ (1− αn)P0(y) + αnP1(y), (6.12)


























we define the distributions
PN
′
















The crux of our approach is based on Lemma 14 below, which shows that the covert
process QN ′αn is nearly indistinguishable from the innocent distribution Q
⊗N ′
0 for ap-
propriate choices of αn and N .











and N ≜ nθn
ωn log θn , such that log θn ∈ o (n), log θn > 0,
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The proof of Lemma 14 is given in Appendix 6.A. Since QN ′αn is nearly indistin-
guishable from Q⊗N ′0 for a large n and our choice of αn and N , we only need to design
a scheme that closely approximates the covert stochastic process QN ′αn to communicate
covertly with Bob.
6.5 Main Result
Our main result is the existence of asynchronous covert communication schemes that
do not require a key to communicate reliably with the legitimate receiver while being
simultaneously covert from an asynchronous warden.
Theorem 6. Consider a discrete memoryless point-to-point covert channel with Q1 ≪




such that log θn ∈ o (n) and log θn > 0. If
D(P1∥P0) > D(Q1∥Q0), then for any M that satisfies both of the following conditions,
for an arbitrary ξ ∈ (0, 1),














there exist ξ1, ξ2 > 0 depending on ξ,WY |X ,WZ|X , and an asynchronous covert com-







, (6.22)∣∣∣D(Q̂N ′Z ∥Q⊗N ′0 )− D(QN ′αn∥Q⊗N ′0 )∣∣∣ ⩽ exp(−ξ2√n log θn) . (6.23)
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Proof. We rely on random coding arguments, Bernstein’s inequality, and channel
resolvability techniques developed in [27] and previous chapters to prove Theorem 6.
Random Codebook Generation We generate M codewords xi ∈ {x0, x1}n with










where γ > 0 will be defined later. The encoder at Alice maps the message W = i
to the codeword xi of length n, and randomly chooses a time epoch t ∈ J1, NK to
transmit the sequence. If no message is communicated by Alice, i corresponds to a
null message ϕ. Alice transmits the innocent symbol x0 in all other channel uses.
The objective for Bob is to decode the transmitted message from the longer se-
quence y of length N ′ despite not knowing the time of transmission. Note that we do
not require the receiver to find the correct transmission time t. The decoder at Bob
operates as follows.
• Fix a n-length decoding window starting at u = 1.
• If there exists a unique i ∈ J1,MK such that (xi,yu+n−1u ) ∈ Anγ , output Ŵ = i,
and stop decoding. Else, increment u and iterate; that is, the decoding window
slides across the monitoring window as illustrated in Figure 6.1;
• else if there is no i ∈ J1,MK and a choice of u such that (xi,yu+n−1u ) ∈ Anγ ,
output Ŵ = ϕ;
• else, declare a decoding error.
Channel Reliability Analysis The average decoding error probability satisfies
the following lemma.
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yu+1 . . .
1 N N2
. . .y1 y2 . . . yu yu+n 1 yN 
u + 1u u + n   1
Decoding Window
yN . . .
Monitoring Window
Figure 6.1: Temporal representation of the channel output.








. For an arbitrary ν ∈ (0, 1), and a
large n, there exists K > 0, such that the probability of decoding error averaged over
all random codebooks satisfies




ν2n (αnD2(P1||P0) +O (α2n))











The proof of Lemma 15 follows the reliability analysis techniques used in previous
chapters. Hence, for the choice of αn and θn in Theorem 6 and for an arbitrary
δ ∈ (0, 1), if







there exists a constant ξ′1 > 0, such that for a large n,







Channel Resolvability Analysis Based on the discussion of Section 6.4, it is
sufficient to show that the induced distribution Q̂N ′Z is close to QN
′












For an arbitrary ν ∈ (0, 1), µ0 ≜ minz Q0(z), and n large enough, there exists K ′ > 0
such that the KL divergence between Q̂N ′Z and QN
′
























ν2n (αnD2(Q1||Q0) +O (α2n))






with τ = (1 + ν)n (αnD(Q1∥Q0) +O (α2n)).
The proof of Lemma 16 follows the channel resolvability techniques used in previ-
ous chapters. Hence, for the choice of αn and θn in Theorem 6 and for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
if

























Identification of a code Following the same arguments as in [27] to identify a
code, we show that there exists at least one asynchronous coding scheme such that
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and that for this specific code there exists a constant ξ2 > 0 such that
∣∣∣D(Q̂N ′Z ∥Q⊗N ′0 )− D(QN ′αn∥Q⊗N ′0 )∣∣∣ ⩽ exp(−ξ2√n log θn) . (6.35)
171
APPENDIX
6.A Proof of Lemma 14























































(1 + αnΨ(zi)) . (6.38)
We define a set {Si,1,Si,2, . . . ,Si,i} ⊆ Jt, t+ n− 1K of cardinality i by Si. We assume






































































































t + n   1 u + n   1
1 N Nu + n   1



























































































i, if Si ⊆ Ju, u+ n− 1K
0 , else,
(6.46)
and (b) follows from splitting the sums based on whether t is smaller, equal to, or
larger than u as illustrated in Figure 6.A.1. Define βn ≜ 1 + α2nχ. We rewrite the
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n ((n− 2) (βn − 1)− 1)
(βn − 1)2





























(βnn − 1) . (6.49)
By symmetry with the first term in (6.45), we rewrite the third term on the right
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analyze each term in (6.52) separately and ultimately choose the value of N that















Similarly, for the second term in (6.52), we have
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Combining the analysis of all terms in (6.52), we conclude that for a given θn, we need
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